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COMMENT
THE UNITED KINGDOM'S DECLARATION OF
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: CREATING A
SUPREME COURT TO SECURE INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS UNDER THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT OF
1998
James Hyre*
"The trouble with doing a thing for cosmetic reasons is that one
always ends up with a cosmetic result, and cosmetic results, as we
know from inspecting rich American women, are ludicrous,
embarrassing and horrific."1
INTRODUCTION
It is not often that an established democracy decides to overhaul the
framework of its government. The British Government, headed by
the Labour Party, has decided to transform its governing powers
without an impending crisis.2 For Lord Falconer, the government
official spearheading the judicial reforms, "the best time to reform
and improve is not at a time of crisis, but from a position of strength
and stability."3
And so on June 12, 2003, the Labour government issued a proposal
* J.D. Candidate, 2005, Fordham University School of Law, Notes & Articles Editor,
Fordham Law Review.
1. Stephen Fry, Moab is My Washpot 23 (1997).
2. Lord Falconer of Thoroton, Speech to Law Society Council, at
http://www.dca.gov.uk/speeches/2003/lcl71203.htm (Dec. 17, 2003) (listing the
proposed reforms, including: removing the Law Lords from the House of Lords,
creating a Supreme Court, ending the role of the Lord Chancellor, and establishing an
independent commission to handle judicial appointments). The British Labour Party
began referring to itself as New Labour during the mid-1990s to reflect the significant
policy shift from the left to center, which coincided with the party's widespread
political success. Definition of New Labour, at
http://www.wordiq.com/definition/New-Labour (last visited Sept. 20, 2004).
3. Id. Lord Falconer described his reasons for suggesting further reform: "I
think we here in the UK can hold our heads up high about the British justice system.
It is good. It does work. But just because it is good and it does work doesn't mean
that we shouldn't seek to improve it." Id.
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for a British Supreme Court.4 The government believes that the
renewed focus on individual rights in the Human Rights Act of 1998
("HRA")5 makes it necessary to formally end the judicial role of the
House of Lords to enhance the appearance of judicial independence.6
Motivated by the increased integration with the European Union, and
the recognition of positive individual rights, the Labour government
aims to secure judicial independence, in practice and in appearance.
Although the issue of judicial independence has long been an issue
in the United Kingdom ("UK"),7 the impetus for the current proposal
4. Department for Constitutional Affairs, Constitutional Reform: A Supreme
Court for the United Kingdom 1, at www.dca.gov.uk/consult/supremecourt (July
2003) [hereinafter Supreme Court]. The British government announced the abolition
of the position of Lord Chancellor and the creation of the Department of
Constitutional Affairs. See id. 18.
5. See Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, sched. 1, art. 6(1) (Eng.), available at
http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/80042- d.htm ("[Elveryone is
entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and
impartial tribunal established by law." (emphasis added)).
6. See Lord Falconer of Thoroton, Constitutional Reform Speech at the
University College of London, at http://www.dca.gov.uk/speeches/2003/lc081203.htm
(Dec. 8, 2003). The speech stated:
In the same piece of legislation, the Government proposes to create a
distinct Supreme Court. The Law Lords will be taken out of the House of
Lords and set up in a separate Supreme Court. People are increasingly
sensitive to the need to underline that our judicial system is independent of
both the executive and the legislature. The present arrangements, whereby
the highest court in the land sits under the guise of a committee of the House
of Lords, are obscure and appear to compromise the independence of the
judiciary. It need not be the case that this independence has, in fact, been
compromised; however, the perception of inadequate separation exists.
We are not proposing any fundamental change in the nature of the Court.
The principle of parliamentary sovereignty will remain. The Court will not
be able to strike down legislation in the manner of such courts elsewhere.
Our Supreme Court will be true to our constitutional heritage. However, I
do believe that by establishing a distinct Supreme Court, for the whole of the
UK, we shall enhance the credibility of the judicial system in the eyes of
citizens. A distinct Supreme Court, quite definitively outwith the legislature,
will, as Lord Steyn put it, "carry in the eyes of the public a badge of
independence and neutrality; it will be a potent symbol of the allegiance of
our country to the rule of law."
Id. Some commentators argue that the current system functions well under a balance
of powers regime and no reform is necessary. See infra Part II.B; see also Robert
Stevens, The English Judges: Their Role in the Changing Constitution 129 (2002)
(quoting Judges Council that the Lord Chancellor had "proved invaluable in
maintaining the independence of the judiciary in England and Wales and [the Judges'
Council had] considerable anxiety that any other arrangement would result, in time,
in the encroachment of executive government into the proper sphere of judicial
independence essential in a democratic society" (citation omitted)).
7. As early as 1867, scholars were calling for the creation of a Supreme Court.
See Lord Johan Steyn, The Case for a Supreme Court, 118 L. Q. Rev. 382, 382 (2002)
(citing Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution 149 (Fontana Press 1993) (1867)).
Lord Steyn quoted Bagehot:
I do not reckon the judicial function of the House of Lords as one of its true
subsidiary functions. First because it does not in fact exercise it, next
because I wish to see it in appearance deprived of it. The Supreme Court of
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was the rise of New Labour and its platform for reform in the 1990s.
New Labour pressed for the adoption of the HRA, which
incorporated most of the European Convention on Human Rights
("ECHR" or "Strasbourg Court")8 and obligated domestic courts to
apply international human rights law.9 The HRA has renewed focus
on the independence of the judiciary. 10 In practice, the English
judiciary passed this inspection thanks to its reputation of
independence and impartiality." But the New Labour government is
attempting to reform the judiciary to improve the appearance of
independence and impartiality. 2
Because the Law Lords are a Committee of the House of Lords,
observers have questioned the appearance of independence from
Parliament. 3 Further, individual Law Lords serve on commissions to
investigate matters of political importance and to lend an air of
the English people ought to be a great conspicuous tribunal.., ought not to
be hidden beneath the robes of a legislative assembly.
Id. Rodney Brazier outlined a simplified method of establishing an independent
Supreme Court quite similar to the government proposal. See Rodney Brazier,
Constitutional Reform 180 (2d ed. 1998).
8. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5, available at
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm. Protocol 11 to the
Convention delegates enforcement of all claims to the Strasbourg Court. See id. For a
thorough discussion of the operation of the ECHR in protecting fundamental rights in
Europe, see Joseph R. Wetzel, Note, Improving Fundamental Rights Protection in the
European Union: Resolving the Conflict and Confusion Between the Luxembourg and
Strasbourg Courts, 71 Fordham L. Rev. 2823, 2826-41 (2003).
9. See Paul Ashcroft et al., Human Rights and the Courts: Bringing Justice Home
15, 33 (1999).
10. The HRA incorporates most of the ECHR, including Article 6, which
recognizes the right to a fair trial. See Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, sched. 1 (Eng.),
available at http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/80042-d.htm. Article
6(1) states:
In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal
charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.
Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be
excluded from all or part of the trial in the interest of morals, public order or
national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or
the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent
strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where
publicity would prejudice the interests of justice.
Id. art. 6(1) (emphasis added).
11. See Stevens, supra note 6, at 82 ("[Tjhe English judges rank high on any
international table of objectivity, particularly with respect to individual litigants.").
12. See Supreme Court, supra note 4, 3 ("The [HRA], specifically in relation to
Article 6 of the [ECHR], now requires a stricter view to be taken not only of anything
which might undermine the independence or impartiality of a judicial tribunal, but
even of anything which might appear to do so.").
13. See Supreme Court, supra note 4, 1, 3; see also Stevens, supra note 6, at 76-
88. The Law Lords are members of the House of Lords-one of the Houses of
Parliament along with the House of Commons.
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impartiality to the proceedings. 4 Their commission positions expose
the judges to political criticism and frequent accusations of partiality. 5
To satisfy the provisions of the HRA, the Labour government has
proposed the creation of a Supreme Court independent of the House
of Lords, which would sever the judiciary from Parliament and end
their role of heading investigatory commissions. 6
This Comment examines the Labour government's proposal 7 to
establish a Supreme Court of the United Kingdom. 8 The immediate
aim of the Supreme Court proposal was to secure the appearance of
impartiality and independence of the British judiciary by severing the
connection between the House of Lords and the highest court of
appeal.' 9 However, the current judiciary arguably functions both
independently and with impartiality," so this Comment explores the
necessity and scope of a British Supreme Court. This Comment
agrees that the proposed Supreme Court is necessary, but not for the
reasons presented by the government.
Two issues frame this discussion of a Supreme Court of the United
Kingdom. First, should there be a formal separation of powers and a
14. These committee positions have some parallel in the United States, e.g., the
Warren Commission investigation of the Kennedy assassination, but the U.S. has
generally frowned upon such quasi-judicial activities. Stevens, supra note 6, at 83.
15. See id. at 84.
16. Supreme Court, supra note 4, 18, 36, 57; Lord Steyn, supra note 7, at 382;
see also infra Part II.A. The government and commentators cite two reasons for
separating the High Court of the UK from the House of Lords. First, the position of
Lord Chancellor combined all three branches of government. See Lord Steyn, supra
note 7, at 382. Second, the Law Lords potentially and apparently share legislative and
judicial duties that may conflict in appearance and in practice with modern
conceptions of proper government. See id.
17. The Labour government has proposed a wide array of constitutional reforms.
The reforms include a new manner of selecting judges, ending hereditary membership
in the House of Lords, reforming the position of Lord Chancellor, and establishing a
Supreme Court. See generally Department for Constitutional Affairs, Constitutional
Reform: A New Way of Appointing Judges [hereinafter A New Way of Appointing
Judges], at http://www.dca.gov.uk/consult/jacommission/index.htm (July 2003);
Department for Constitutional Affairs, Constitutional Reform: Next Steps For the
House of Lords, $$ 24-28 [hereinafter HOL's Next Stdp], at
http://www.dca.gov.uk/consult/holref/index.htm (Sept. 2003); Department for
Constitutional Affairs, Constitutional Reform: Reforming the Office of the Lord
Chancellor [hereinafter Reforming the Office of the Lord Chancellor], at
http://www.dca.gov.uk/consult/lcoffice/index.htm (Sept. 2003); Supreme Court, supra
note 4. Together, the reforms aim to modernize the distribution of governing powers
in the UK. See The Queen's Speech, available at
http://politics.guardian.co.uk/queensspeech2003/story/0,13994,1093558,00.html (Nov.
26, 2003).
18. Rt. Hon. Lord Nolan, The Judiciary, in The Making & Remaking of the
British Constitution 67 (1997) ("Discussions about the constitutional role of the
judiciary tend to concentrate upon the trend of decisions in the High Court, the Court
of Appeal, and the House of Lords.").
19. See Supreme Court, supra note 4, 3; see also infra Part II.B.
20. See infra Part II.B.
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more explicit conception of judicial independence? 21 If yes, does the
new court need the power of judicial review of legislative acts? 22
After providing background information in Part I, Part II analyzes
alternative responses to these questions about whether the current
judiciary is already functionally independent.23 Part II.A describes the
government's proposal.24 Part II.B finds that no change is necessary
because the balance of powers offers effective protection for
individual rights.25 Part II.C considers and supports the government's
position that the appearance of independence necessitates a Supreme
Court but does not grant that court the ability to overrule legislation. 6
This Comment argues that securing judicial independence in
practice requires resolving the conflict between separating the
branches and retaining parliamentary sovereignty.27 Part III argues
that the British Government should seize this unique opportunity to
shape the government of the UK by adopting the separation of
powers, recognizing judicial review, and redefining the doctrine of
parliamentary supremacy.2 1 This part suggests that judicial
independence requires adopting separation of powers and giving the
new court the power to review and overturn legislation.29
I. A FRAMEWORK OF THE CURRENT STRUCTURE
Part I outlines the structure of the governing powers in the UK.3"
This part describes three foundational concepts of the UK
Government: Parliamentary sovereignty, the balance of powers, and
the separation of powers.31 This part details the recognition of
individual rights in the UK.32 It defines judicial impartiality and
independence,33 and outlines the structure of the UK's highest courts
of appeal.34 Part I also looks at the impact of the HRA, which
provides the textual and political impetus for the Supreme Court
proposal.35
21. Stevens, supra note 6, at 141; see also infra note 209 and accompanying text.
22. Colin B. Picker, "A Light unto the Nations" - The New British Federalism, The
Scottish Parliament, and Constitutional Lessons for Multiethnic States, 77 Tul. L. Rev.
1, 19 (2002); see also infra note 210 and accompanying text.
23. See infra Part II.
24. See infra Part II.A.
25. See infra Part II.B.
26. See infra Part II.C.
27. See infra Part III.
28. See infra Part III.
29. See infra Parts III.B-C.
30. See infra Part I.A.
31. See infra Part I.B.
32. See infra Part I.C.
33. See infra Part I.D.
34. See infra Part I.E.
35. See infra Part I.F.
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A. A Brief Outline of the Governmental Structure of the UK
The basic governmental structure of the UK is simple.36 There are
two Houses of Parliament: the Commons, whose members are
elected, and the Lords, whose members are appointed and were
hereditary until 1999. The government is selected from both Houses
by the Prime Minister.37 However, the House of Commons is
considered the dominant House and the base of sovereign authority.
3 8
By the early nineteenth century, parliamentary sovereignty had
been accepted by lawyers and political theorists.3 9 The power to enact
and repeal legislation officially resides in "the King, Lords, and
Commons jointly,"4 with the role of the Crown now reduced to a
mere formality. By reducing the role of an independent crown,
Parliament has consolidated the governing power of the UK.41
The House of Commons is the directly elected House of
Parliament.42 The Commons carries out almost all of the legislative
and governing functions in Parliament.43 While the current proposals
for constitutional reform do not seek to alter the responsibilities of the
36. For a thorough outline of the governmental structure, see Rodney Brazier,
Constitutional Practice: The Foundations of British Government (3d ed. 1999).
37. Eric Taylor, The House of Commons at Work ix (Macmillan Press, 9th ed.
1979).
38. See Lord Irvine of Lairg, Sovereignty in Comparative Perspective:
Constitutionalism in Britain and America, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 13 & nn.56-58 (2001).
The Salisbury Convention effectively prevents the House of Lords from contesting
the proposed Supreme Court and other constitutional reforms since they were
"electoral pledges." Id. As Lord Irvine explained:
In 1945, the Labour Party won an overall majority of seats in the House of
Commons, yet the House of Lords was dominated by unelected
Conservative peers who had inherited their seats. [The House of Lords
agreed] that it would be 'constitutionally wrong' for the House of Lords to
prevent the ... commitments of the elected Government from being enacted
into law .... [Tjhe Salisbury Convention thus emerged, according to which
the unelected Chamber does not vote against legislation which seeks to give
effect to electoral pledges that have been endorsed by the majority of voters.
Id. (internal citations omitted and emphasis added).
39. Jeffrey Goldsworthy, The Sovereignty of Parliament: History and Philosophy
221 (1999). For example, in 1830, Samuel Taylor Coleridge stated that:
The Omnipotence of Parliament, in the mouth of a lawyer, and understood
exclusively of the restraints and remedies within the competence of our Law-
courts [as opposed to resistance by the nation as a whole], is objectionable
only as bombast. It is but a puffing pompous way of stating a plain matter of
fact .... [W]ithin the sphere of the Courts quicquid Rex cum Parliamento
voluit, Fatum sit [whatever the King with Parliament has decided, let it be
Fate]!
Id. (citation omitted).
40. Id. (citation omitted).
41. See id.
42. See Taylor, supra note 37, at ix.
43. Meg Russell, Reforming the House of Lords: Lessons from Overseas 11
(2000) (noting that "the House of Commons [is] where most major legislation
begins").
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House of Commons directly, the reformation of the House of Lords
into a functional legislative House would create a balanced bicameral
legislature that would naturally check some of the current Commons'
power.4 The Prime Minister is elected as the leader of the House of
Commons and acts as the UK's executive head of government.45
Representing the upper house of Parliament, the House of Lords
has a traditionally hereditary membership. 46 Although constructed as
a house of nobility to balance the power of the public in the House of
Commons, the House of Lords has "always been inferior" to the
Commons. 47  Besides its deferential legislative role, the House of
Lords also serves a judicial function.48
The House of Lords is a house in transition.49 Recent New Labour
reforms have resulted in the appointment of so-called Labour Lords
on the basis of achievement rather than heredity.5" The House of
Lords Act 19991 reformed the upper house into a transitional
chamber," and more reforms are proposed. 3 If realized, the new
reforms would result in a U.S. Senate-like house with expanded
legislative and governing functions. The realization of the bi-cameral
remodeling remains uncertain because-unlike most constitutional
reforms-they are not taking place during a national crisis and are
subject to political sacrifice. 4
The executive branch has grown in power despite the obsolescence
of the Crown. Traditionally, the Prime Minister is simply the first
minister and part of the Parliament. In practice, the Prime Minister,
a member of the House of Commons selected to lead the government,
has become a presidential figure over the last 30 to 40 years.56 While
44. See, e.g., id. at 254-59.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution 71 (2001).
48. Supreme Court, supra note 4, 8. The judicial role of the House of Lords lies
at the center of the Supreme Court proposal. See infra Part I.E. For an historical look
at the judicial role of the House of Lords, see Robert Stevens, Law and Politics: The
House of Lords as a Judicial Body, 1800-1976 (1978) [hereinafter Stevens, Law and
Politics].
49. See generally Russell, supra note 43.
50. See id. at 13; see also HOL's Next Step, supra note 17, IT 24-28.
51. House of Lord Act, 1999, c. 34, § 2(2) (Eng.), available at
http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1999/19990034.htm.
52. See Russell, supra note 43, at 340.
53. See id. at 15, 261-92 (discussing the role and functions of the reformed
chamber).
54. See id. at 339. Russell noted that "[e]ven true democrats in government will
find it hard to prioritise a parliamentary reform which will involve their work being
scrutinised more closely." Id. at 340.
55. See Picker, supra note 22, at 19.
56. See id. at 19-20 ("In fact, if not in theory, the Prime Minister is Head of State,
Chief Executive and Chief Legislator, and while in Office, is not circumscribed by any
clear or binding constitutional limitations." (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted)).
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still holding a seat in the legislative Parliament, the Prime Minister
selects a Cabinet of advisors, conducts the foreign policy of the UK,
and proposes legislation and constitutional reforms. Without a
formal system of checks and balances or an internal balance of
parliamentary power, the Prime Minister can act unilaterally to create
a Supreme Court of the UK."
Because this Comment is based on the basic theories concerning the
distribution of governing power in the UK, Part I.B examines the
theories and how they relate to each other.
B. Parliamentary Sovereignty, a Balance of Powers, and the Separation
of Powers
The political theories contributing to the distribution of governing
power in the UK are quite complicated. Scholars and politicians both
frequently use the terms "parliamentary sovereignty," "balance of
powers," and "separation of powers" in combination to describe the
British system.59 Therefore, a simplistic description and general
understanding of the relation of the three concepts is necessary for the
purposes of this Comment: Parliamentary sovereignty vests
Parliament with supreme legal authority,6" the balance of powers
requires that the government informally share its legislative,
executive, and judicial powers,6" while the separation of powers,
although always historically recognized, rises in prominence with the
increased focus on individual rights flowing from the HRA.
57. See id. at 19.
58. See id. at 20.
If the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, collectively the Executive, are
together in the Parliament, then the Parliament can act as a check on the
Executive's power. If the executive and the Parliament are formally
separate, then checks and balances can be built into the system, as in the
United States. However, if the Executive and the Parliament are not
formally separate, yet are in fact separate, there will then be no structural
checks and balances and the Executive will have carte blanche power to act
as it so desires.
Id.
59. See, e.g., Stevens, supra note 6, at 85-86. For example, in the Supreme Court
proposal, the government suggests that a Supreme Court is necessary to ensure the
separation of powers, but retains the concept of parliamentary sovereignty. Supreme
Court, supra note 4, IT Executive Summary, 20, 23; see also infra Part II.A.
60. A. V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution 42 (10th
ed. 1961); Douglas W. Vick, The Human Rights Act and the British Constitution, 37
Tex. Int'l L.J. 329, 335 & nn.38-41 (2002). Prof. Vick is a Lecturer of Law at the
University of Stirling. See id. at 329. As will become apparent, this Comment is
heavily indebted to the arguments made by Prof. Vick.
61. Stevens, supra note 6, at 86. Because all members of the Houses of Commons
and Lords, the Prime Minister and the Law Lords are members of Parliament, all
three governing powers reside in Parliament. See Taylor, supra note 37, at ix.
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This Comment first turns to perhaps the most fundamental force
behind the British constitutional system, parliamentary sovereignty,
which vests the supreme power over legislation in Parliament.
1. Parliamentary Sovereignty
The historical explication of parliamentary sovereignty is clearly set
out by A. V. Dicey, one of the preeminent British constitutional
scholars at the turn of the 20th century.62 Dicey argued that
Parliament was sovereign because it has "the right to make or unmake
any law whatever."63  Dicey's original conception held that the
"Queen in Parliament" gave Parliament supremacy over British
political institutions.' Since Dicey, scholars have refined the concept
to illustrate the growing preeminence of Parliament and the reduction
of the Crown's role. Jeffrey Goldsworthy, a constitutional lawyer and
a professor at Monash University, examined the historical emergence
of parliamentary sovereignty and defined the historical conception of
the doctrine: "Parliament is able to enact or repeal any law
whatsoever, and.., the courts have no authority to judge statutes
invalid for violating either moral or legal principles of any kind."65
Lord Irvine of Lairg offered a modern version of parliamentary
sovereignty in his article on comparative constitutionalism that
focuses on the popular sovereignty of the House of Commons, but the
66 mdrsupremacy of parliamentary legislation remains. This modern
conception of parliamentary sovereignty focused more on the
democratic election of the House of Commons: "[T]he legal
sovereignty exercised by Parliament now is viewed as deriving its
62. See Dicey, supra note 60, at 39-40. For a discussion on the sovereignty of
Parliament, see id. at xxxiv-xcvi, 39-85, 138-80 (setting forth the definitive
explication). See also Goldsworthy, supra note 39 (providing a recent historical
account); Lord Irvine of Lairg, supra note 38 (articulating a modern definition).
63. Dicey, supra note 60, at 40, cited in Vick, supra note 60, at 335 n.42. Sir
William Blackstone famously noted the extensive power of Parliament:
[I]f the parliament will positively enact a thing to be done which is
unreasonable, I know of no power that can control it: and the examples
usually alleged in support of this sense of the rule do none of them prove,
that where the main object of a statute is unreasonable the judges are at
liberty to reject it; for that were to set the judicial power above the
legislative, which would be subversive of all government.
Scott Douglas Gerber, The Myth of Marbury v. Madison and the Origins of Judicial
Review, in Marbury Versus Madison: Documents and Commentary 2 (Mark A.
Graber & Michael Perhac eds., 2002) (discussing the origins of legislative supremacy
and quoting Blackstone (citation omitted)).
64. Dicey, supra note 60, at 39.
65. Goldsworthy, supra note 39, at 1 (citation omitted); see Dicey, supra note 60,
at 39-40. The deference shown to Parliament is apparent in the proposal for the new
Supreme Court: The power of a court to overturn legislation is unnecessary in the
UK because "[i]n our democracy, Parliament is supreme." Supreme Court, supra note
4,$ 23.
66. Lord Irvine of Lairg, supra note 38, at 13.
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legitimacy from the fact that Parliament's composition is, in the first
place, determined by the electorate in whom ultimate political
sovereignty resides. 67
The Supreme Court proposal facially retained this conception of
parliamentary sovereignty by not allowing the court to overturn any
legislation.6" To make parliamentary sovereignty functional and
responsive to the needs of its citizens, the UK needs a "self-correcting
democracy. . . effected by the political mechanisms of ministerial
responsibility and parliamentary scrutiny" to preserve individual
rights.69 This concept represents a "working relationship" between
the branches of government known as the balance of powers.7v
2. Balance of Powers
Premised on parliamentary sovereignty, the British constitutional
government uses a balance of powers-legislative, judicial, and
executive-among governing bodies without a formal or explicit
delineation of those powers.71 The premise of this delicate balance is
that Parliament is the sovereign head of the government, and no
derivative part of that government can usurp the power of Parliament
as the final arbiter of legislation.72
The Act of Settlement of 170173 marked the first attempt to
articulate a separation of powers in the UK.74 The Act attempted to
limit the power of the throne to interfere with the power of
Parliament.75 By failing to separate the powers of the judiciary from
the legislature and executive, the Act limits the necessity of, and
rationale for, an independent judiciary.76
Without an explicit separation of powers, the UK government relies
on a balance of powers that informally checks the legislative,
67. Id.
68. See Supreme Court, supra note 4, $$ 7, 23; for an in depth discussion of these
provisions, see infra Part II.A.
69. Vick, supra note 60, 341 (citation omitted).
70. Stevens, supra note 6, at 85.
71. See generally Dicey, supra note 60; see also Stevens, supra note 6, at 85-86.
72. Dicey, supra note 60, at 39-40 ("[N]o person or body is recognised by the law
of England as having a right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament.").
73. The Act of Settlement, 1701, 12 & 13 Will. 3, c. 2 (Eng.), reprinted in Sources
of English Constitutional History: A Selection of Documents From A.D. 600 to the
Present, at 610 (Carl Stephenson & Frederick Marcham eds., 1937).
74. Stevens, supra note 6, at 9.
The effort to keep the executive out of the legislature and to offer a measure
of protection to the judiciary could have led to a concept of the separation of
powers along what became the American model.... Yet balance of powers
rather than separation of powers was the British choice.
Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
[Vol. 73
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executive, and judicial powers.77 Lord Simon of Glaisdale has
described the balance of powers as "something far more subtle and far
more valuable" than a separation of powers.78 He reasoned that
separation is useless without a proper balance of the legislature and
the judiciary.79 In practice, Lord Simon said, "a balance of powers...
will vouchsafe liberty of the subject and individual rights."8 But some
believe that ensuring individual rights and preserving liberty would
require formally separating the powers of government."
3. Separation of Powers
As opposed to the balance of powers, the doctrine of separation of
powers seeks to empower different branches of government with
legislative, executive, and judicial powers independent of each other.82
Perhaps the most pointed declaration of the separation of powers was
drafted by John Adams in the 1780 Massachusetts Constitution.83 The
77. Id. at 85.
78. Id. citing 609 Parl. Deb., H.L. (5th Ser.) (1999) 719. Lord Simon's statement
reads:
What we had was not separation of powers but something far more subtle
and far more valuable-a balance of powers. It is no use separating your
executive if it has powers over the individual which are considered
inordinate. The executive's powers should be balanced by that of the
legislative and the adjudicature. That is threatened by advocacy of a system
purely based on separation of powers. It is a balance of powers that will
vouchsafe liberty of the subject and individual rights.
Id. at 85-86.
79. See id. at 85.
80. Id. at 86.
81. See infra Part I.B.3.
82. Writing in favor of the division of governmental authority in his book The
Spirit of Laws, Montesquieu wrote:
There is no liberty if the judiciary power be not separated from the
legislature and the executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and
liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge
would then be the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the
judge might behave with violence and oppression.
Charles de Secondat Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Law (Anne M. Cohler et al.,
trans. and eds., 1989) (1748), cited in RMA Chongwe, Judicial Review of Executive
Action: Government Under the Law, in Parliamentary Supremacy and Judicial
Independence: A Commonwealth Approach 103, 105 (John Hatchard & Peter Slinn
eds., 1998) [hereinafter Chongwe, Judicial Review of Executive Action].
83. Adams's Article reads:
In the government of this Commonwealth, the legislative department shall
never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them: The
executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of
them: The judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers,
or either of them: to the end it may be a government of laws and not of
men.
Ma. Const. art. XXX cited in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); see also Robert Stevens, A Loss of Innocence?: Judicial Independence
and the Separation of Powers, 19 Oxford J.L.S. 365, 384-85 (1999) [hereinafter
Stevens, Loss of Innocence].
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founders of the United States established a government with formal
separation of powers with the legislative Congress, the executive
President, and the judicial Supreme Court, although it was not as strict
as Adams's conception.' As Vick notes, the English conceive the
separation of powers as "essential to the protection of the individual
from the arbitrary exercise of power by the state.""5
Unfortunately, the modern separation of powers in the UK proves
difficult to define succinctly.86 One scholar found that UK scholars
paid little attention to the principle of the separation of powers and
instead focused on the balance of powers.87 When they did discuss the
separation of powers, UK scholars dismissed the doctrine for lack of
coherence preferring the balance of powers to protect individual
liberties.88
Instead of Montesquieu's conception of strictly separated powers,
scholars have found a highly modified form of separation of powers in
the UK. Professor Vick, in a 2002 article, offered perhaps the most
succinct version of the emergence of the separation of powers in the
UK.89 He traces the early exposition of the concept to the thirteenth
century reign of Edward 1.90 He notes that the modern system of
internal checks and balances is more complex than Montesquieu's
conception.9" The legislative functions are intimately related to the
executive power: Indeed, executive power, referred to as the
government, consists mainly of members of Parliament.92 This close
interaction between the executive and the legislature is viewed as
"[tihe efficient secret of the [British] Constitution."93  Similarly, as
N.W. Barber noted in his recent article, the Montesquieu ideal is
never seen in practice.94 Instead, modern states have "many inter-
linked legislative bodies," the judicial power is shared by
administrators and courts, and the executive picks up any power the
other two leave behind.95 In a 1995 article, Barendt found that the
executive and legislature were not effectively separated because there
84. See Chongwe, Judicial Review of Executive Action, supra note 82, at 105.
85. Vick, supra note 60, at 341. But see id. at n.88.
86. For a general discussion, see Maurice John Crowley Vile, Constitutionalism
and the Separation of Powers (2d ed. 1998); N.W. Barber, Prelude to the Separation of
Powers, 60 Cambridge L.J. 59 (2001) (arguing that efficiency, not liberty, is the basis
of separation of powers); Eric Barendt, Separation of Powers and Constitutional
Government, 1995 Pub. L. 599, 606 (defining the separation of powers doctrine as
preserving liberty and individual rights).
87. Barendt, supra note 86, at 599.
88. Id. at 599-600 (describing the doctrine's treatment by Sir Ivor Jennings) (citing
Sir Ivor Jennings, The Law and Constitution 7-28 and app. I (5th ed. 1969)).
89. See Vick, supra note 60, at 342-43 nn.90-100.
90. Id. at 342 & n.90.
91. Id. at 342 & n.92.
92. Id. at 342 & n.93-94.
93. Id. at 342 (quoting Bagehot, supra note 47, at 10).
94. Barber, supra note 86, at 70-71.
95. Id. at 71.
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was no system of checks and balances. 96 But he argued that judicial
power was separated from the legislative and executive. 97 Barendt
also expressed concerns that, although separated from Parliament, the
judiciary needed the power to check Parliament.98
The muddled state of the separation of powers in the UK provided
the Labor government with the recent impetus to reform the House of
Lords. 99 But Barendt argued that no major party "would favour
constitutional reform which would impose more effective checks and
balances on the executive."'' 0  And, indeed, the government's
proposal explicitly limited the judiciary's ability to overturn
legislation. 10'
Before turning to the structure of the British high court and the
impact of the Human Rights Act, Parts I.C and I.D explore the
recognition of individual rights and the definitions of judicial
independence and impartiality.
C. The Recognition of Individual Rights
The UK Government has long believed that individual rights do not
require positive declaration.0 2  Since the UK has no written
constitution with a specific grant of rights, the right to free speech is
defined not in an affirmative grant, but by negative implication.' 3 A
British citizen is allowed to say whatever she wants as long as there is
96. Barendt, supra note 86, at 614.
97. Id. at 615 (finding that judges could not sit in the House of Commons, are
protected from removal, and the House of Lords appellate functions were limited to
judicial peers). However, Barendt also noted that the position of the Lord Chancellor
and "the freedom.. .of the Law Lords to participate in the legislative debates of the
Upper House, contravene the principle, albeit moderately and perhaps acceptably."
Id.
98. Id. at 617 ("Judicial control of parliamentary privilege is vital to prevent the
legislature, or one branch of it, abusing its powers.").
99. Supreme Court, supra note 4, Foreword.
100. Barendt, supra note 86, at 617.
101. Supreme Court, supra note 4, 23; see infra Part III.
102. See Vick, supra note 60, at 340-41.
103. See id. at 341 & n.82 (citing Lord Irvine of Lairg, supra note 38, at 15). As the
Law Lords noted:
[W]hereas article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights...
proceeds to state a fundamental right and then to qualify it, we in this
country (where everybody is free to do anything, subject only to the
provisions of the law) proceed rather upon the assumption of freedom of
speech, and turn to our law to discover the established exceptions to it.
Attorney Gen. v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2), 1 A.C. 238, 261-62 (H.L. 1990);
see also Sir Ivor Jennings QC on Fundamental Liberties (1933), in Towards a
Constitutional Bill of Rights for the United Kingdom 121, 123 (Robert Blackburn ed.,
1999) [hereinafter Sir Ivor Jennings]. But see Lord Irvine of Lairg, supra note 38, at
18-19 & n.81 (recognizing that the HRA represents a modern response to the
"outdated-and exaggerated-view of the efficacy of political accountability [i.e.,
relying on the balance of powers to secure rights]").
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no specific prohibition against it." And, as long as Parliament does
not move to restrict free speech, the system will continue to function
efficiently."°5
The UK had no positive declaration of individual rights.10 6 Since its
adoption, some commentators argued that the HRA serves as a de
facto British Bill of Rights. 1 7 The adoption of the HRA signaled a
paradigm shift in recognizing individual rights under British law."0
Previously, individual rights were not positively protected; rather, the
British constitution "rel[ied] on the democratic process, the rule of
law, and the UK's complex system of checks and balances to
safeguard civil liberties." ' 9 Thus, the HRA guarantees positive rights
for individual British citizens that were not previously explicitly
protected.
However, the HRA's guarantee of rights is not entrenched in a
constitutional document beyond the reach of a future legislature. 0
Because the HRA is not protected as a constitutional document, the
Act can be repealed by a simple majority vote in the House of
Commons.1 In addition to the potentially short-lived status of the
HRA, the enforcement of the Act's provisions is weak. The Act does
not override pre-existing acts, but the positive rights guaranteed by
the HRA can be removed by future acts of Parliament. 2 And, most
importantly, courts do not have the right to invalidate incompatible
acts.1 3 Instead the court may declare the legislation incompatible
104. See Dicey, supra note 60, at 240 ("Our present law permits any one to say,
write, and publish what he pleases; but if he make a bad use of this liberty he must be
punished." (citation omitted)); Sir Ivor Jennings, supra note 103, at 124 ("There is no
more a 'right of free speech' than there is a 'right to tie up my shoe-lace'; or, if there is
a right of free speech, there is also a right to tie up my shoe-lace."). Jennings
illustrates the presence of rights through negative implication: "I may invite my
friends to tea in my house and they may assemble on my invitation not because there
is any 'right of assembly'..., but because there is no law which prevents them from
doing so." Sir Ivor Jennings, supra note 103, at 124. On the other hand, many
governments grant the positive recognition of rights. See Dicey, supra note 60, at 238-
39 (contrasting the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the French Constitution of
1791 with the negative protection offered by English law). Generally, Bills of Rights
function as positive recognition of rights and secure a baseline protection for each
citizen.
105. See Sir Ivor Jennings, supra note 103, at 125 ("A Government with a majority
in both Houses of Parliament can restrict liberty as it pleases.").
106. See Vick, supra note 60, at 341 ("In the United Kingdom, it has been thought
that the democratic process, institutional checks and balances, and the vigilance of the
'loyal opposition' in Parliament were the best means of preventing governmental
abuses of human rights." (citation omitted)).
107. See id. at 346 (citing the HRA as the culmination of a Bill of Rights movement
of the last forty years whose goal was the specific protection of individual rights).
108. Id. at 330.
109. Id. at 330 & n.7.
110. Id. at 330.
111. Id.
112. See id. at 330-31 & nn.12-13.
113. Id.
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with the HRA, but that declaration does not compel Parliament to
remedy the incompatibility. 14 Thus, while the HRA recognizes
positive rights for British subjects, the lack of legislative entrenchment
and judicial review limit the impact of a British Bill of Rights.
Before detailing the impact that the HRA has had on the
independence of the British judiciary and exploring the role the HRA
plays in establishing a Supreme Court, Part I.D defines and
distinguishes judicial independence and impartiality.
D. Defining Judicial Impartiality and Independence
Article 6(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 recognizes the right to a
fair trial before an 'independent and impartial' tribunal. 15 Judicial
independence and impartiality are related but distinct concepts that
require definition before this Comment can examine their impact on
the new Supreme Court.
1. Impartiality
To uncover the proper understanding of judicial impartiality, this
Comment looks to the HRA and its subsequent case law. Article 6(1)
of the HRA requires that a court must be impartial. 16 In their book
discussing the judicial review of the HRA, Richard Gordon and Tim
Ward reviewed the case law definition of impartiality.117  To
determine impartiality, the court must decide whether there is a "real
danger of bias on the part of the relevant member of the tribunal." '118
Additionally, there are automatic grounds for judicial recusal,
including financial involvement and personal interest.'19
The House of Lords expanded the circumstances for automatic
disqualification in Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary
Magistrate ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 2).12° There, the Law Lords
clarified the impartiality standard to include matters where the judge
114. Id. at 331 & n.14.
115. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, sched. 1, art. 6(1) (Eng.), available at
http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/actsl998/80042- d.htm.
116. Id.; See Richard Gordon QC & Tim Ward, Judicial Review and the Human
Rights Act 183 (2000).
117. See Gordon & Ward, supra note 116, at 183-85.
118. Regina v. Gough, 1 A.C. 646, 670 (H.L. 1993). The court defined the general
test for impartiality in domestic judicial review as:
having ascertained the relevant circumstances, the court should ask itself
whether, having regard to those circumstances, there was a real danger of
bias on the part of the relevant member of the tribunal in question, in the
sense that he might unfairly regard (or have unfairly regarded) with favour,
or disfavour, the case of a party to the issue under consideration by him.
Id. (emphasis added).
119. See Gordon & Ward, supra note 116, at 183-84.
120. [2000] 1 A.C. 119 (H.L. 1999).
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is involved with one of the parties in the promotion of the cause. 21
The expanded rule "is that a man cannot be a judge in his own
cause."' 22 Previously, the grounds for automatic recusal related to a
judge's monetary or economic interest. 123 This expanded definition of
impartiality has cast serious doubt on the actions of the Law Lords.
124
Given their potential dual role of legislator and judge, Law Lords
would run afoul of the Human Rights Act and Pinochet if they did not
recuse themselves if speaking for a proposal in the House of Lords is
considered acting in their own cause.
1 25
In Locabail (U.K.) Ltd. v. Bayfield Properties Ltd. and Others,126 the
Court of Appeal narrowed the grounds of personal interest recusals.'27
The court found that these disqualifications would be extremely
rare.128 It suggested that the preferred test for protecting the Article
6(1) right was by providing for the disqualification of judges when
there was a 'real danger' of bias.
129
The "real danger" test, as set out in Regina v. Gough,3 ° sets up a
less demanding test than that envisioned by the Strasbourg Court. A
review of the case law indicates that few situations violate Article 6(1)
on impartiality grounds.'3' In Davidson v. Scottish Ministers (No .2),132
121. See id. at 132-37. Lord Browne-Wilkinson, discussing the reasoning of the bias
rule, found that:
although the [previous] cases have all dealt with automatic disqualification
on the grounds of pecuniary interest, there is no good reason... for so
limiting automatic disqualification. The rationale of the whole rule is that a
man cannot be a judge in his own cause. In civil litigation the matters in
issue will normally have an economic impact; therefore a judge is
automatically disqualified if he stands to make a financial gain as a
consequence of his own decision of the case. But if, as in the present case,
the matter at issue does not relate to money or economic advantage but is
concerned with the promotion of the cause, the rationale disqualifying a
judge applies just as much if the judge's decision will lead to the promotion
of a cause in which the judge is involved together with one of the parties.
Id. at 135; see also Gordon & Ward, supra note 116, at 183-84 (citing and discussing
the same).
122. 1 A.C. at 135.
123. See supra text accompanying note 119.
124. Since Law Lords retain the right to speak on causes in the House of Lords,
they could judge in their own cause. Cf Lord Steyn, supra note 7, at 383.
125. See Lord Steyn, supra note 7, at 382.
126. 2000 Q.B. 451 (Eng. C.A.).
127. Id. at 452-53; Gordon & Ward, supra note 116, at 184.
128. See Gordon & Ward, supra note 116, at 184.
129. See id.
130. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
131. Compare R. (Anderson) v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, 1 A.C. 837
(H.L. 2003) (holding that secretary of state fixing minimum sentence tariff for
prisoner despite recommendation of judiciary violated Article 6(1)), and Davidson v.
Scottish Ministers (No. 2), 2002 S.L.T. 1231 (2d Div. Sept 11, 2002) (holding that Lord
Hardie's legislative actions in the House of Lords cast real doubt and "when looking
at the issue objectively, the fair minded and informed observer would have concluded
that there was a real possibility of bias"), available at 2002 WL 31173554 (case
summary), with Coppard v. Customs and Excise Commissioners, 2003 Q.B. 1428
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the court found that a Scottish Lord failed the "real danger" test.
There, the Lord had spoken three times in the House of Lords on the
issue at trial. These legislative actions created "a real possibility of
bias."' 33 By limiting their involvement in the legislative activities of
the House of Lords, the Law Lords can satisfy the requirements of
Gough and Pinochet.T'3  Judicial impartiality then requires the
freedom from bias of an individual judge in an individual case, but the
judicial independence from Parliament focuses on the structural
foundations of the UK's high court.13
5
The United States Supreme Court recently examined the definition
of judicial impartiality. In Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,'36
a case involving campaigns for judicial office, Justice Scalia, writing
for the five-justice majority, defined judicial impartiality as "the lack
of bias for or against either party to the proceeding."' 37 The Court
was faced with the issue of whether a state statute could limit judicial
candidates from discussing their opinions on political or constitutional
issues. 38 It found that the statute violated the positive individual right
of free speech protected by the First Amendment because the statute
was not narrowly tailored to preserve a compelling state interest of
impartiality.'39 By looking at the plain meaning of the term impartial,
the Court decided that judicial impartiality can exist even where
judges have expressed opinions on particular issues.4  Although
informative, the U.S. Supreme Court's view on impartiality does not
control here.
2. Independence
In defining judicial independence under Article 6(1), the European
Court on Human Rights has said that the court must be independent
(Eng. C.A.) (dismissing Article 6(1) argument), and Adan v. Newham London
Borough Council, 1 W.L.R. 2120 (Eng. C.A. 2002) (dismissing Article 6(1) argument).
132. 2002 S.L.T. 1231, available at 2002 WL 31173554 (case summary).
133. Id. at 1240.
134. In fact, the Law Lords have taken significant steps to lessen any concerns of
impartiality by ceasing almost all legislative functions. See Supreme Court, supra note
4, 3; Lord Steyn, supra note 7, at 383-84 (noting that, while the Law Lords have no
official bar to taking part in legislative action, the practice of participating in
legislative hearings has "wither[ed] away").
135. Because under the balance of powers the executive and legislature are not
separate, the current structure may violate Article 6(1). See infra notes 141, 343-48
and accompanying text.
136. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
137. Id. at 775. The Court considers three definitions of judicial impartiality: (1)
requiring an absence of bias to a party; (2) requiring a "lack of preconception in favor
of or against a particular legal view"; (3) requiring "openmindedness," which
"demands... that he be willing to consider views that oppose his preconceptions, and
remain open to persuasion, when the issues arise in a pending case." Id. at 775-78.
138. Id. at 768.
139. Id. at 776-77.
140. Id.
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of the parties involved and the executive. 41 Factors to consider when
examining independence include the manner of appointment, the
duration of office, protection against external pressure, and whether
the body presents an appearance of independence. 14' Another factor
is whether the court can give a binding decision. 43 The government's
Supreme Court proposal focuses on the "appearance of
independence" requirement. 144 When examining the Law Lords'
presence within the House of Lords, few cases question their
independence.1
45
The cases that do focus on independence generally deal with
administrative actions.146 In V v. United Kingdom,147 the ECHR held
the actions of the Home Secretary in setting the punishment of a
detained child violated Article 6(1). In Smith v. Secretary of State for
Trade and Industry,'148  an English court questioned whether
employment tribunals could properly adjudicate claims against the
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry. 49 These cases highlight the
dual roles of administrative agencies and the lack of separation of
powers between the executive and judicial. 5°
The independence of individual British judges when ruling on a
particular case has only recently been seriously questioned. 5' English
judges share common "hallmarks of [judicial] independence-security
of tenure, fiscal independence, impartiality and freedom from
executive pressure."' 52  English judges have significant protection
against arbitrary removal. Under the Act of Settlement of 1701,11
judges could only be dismissed with the agreement of both Houses of
141. Gordon & Ward, supra note 116, at 185 (citing Ringeisen v. Austria No. 1, 1
Eur. H.R. Rep. 455,490 (1979-80)).
142. See id. (citing Campbell & Fell v. United Kingdom, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 165, 198-
99 (1985)).
143. Id. at 186 (citing Findlay v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 221 (1997)
(prison discipline)).
144. Supreme Court, supra note 4, T 3 (noting that the HRA "now requires a
stricter view to be taken not only of anything which might undermine the
independence or impartiality of a judicial tribunal, but even of anything which might
appear to do so").
145. See Gordon & Ward, supra note 116, at 174-77, 185-86.
146. See id. at 186 (noting that "much administrative decision making fails to satisfy
[the Strasbourg] requirement[s]").
147. App. No. 24888/94, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. 121 (1999) (discussing conviction and
sentence for abduction and murder of two-year-old boy).
148. Smith v. Sec'y of State for Trade and Industry, No. EAT/747/97, 1999 WL
809053 (Emp. App. Trib. Oct. 11, 1999).
149. See id.
150. See Gordon & Ward, supra note 116, at 174-77.
151. See infra notes 188-95 and accompanying text.
152. Stevens, supra note 6, at 79.
153. Act of Settlement, 1701, 12 & 13 Will. 3, c. 2 (Eng.), reprinted in Sources of
English Constitutional History: A Selection of Documents From A.D. 600 to the
Present, at 610 (Carl Stephenson & Frederick Marcham eds., 1937).
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Parliament. 5 4 Historically, fiscal independence provides evidence of
judicial independence. The Law Lords receive a salary for their
judicial work paid from an account separate from the House of
Lords.'55 A third hallmark of judicial independence is freedom from
political pressure and executive influence. 5 6 But, while the traditional
hallmarks of independence and impartiality may be satisfied, the
HRA may require maintaining the appearance of both as well.
3. The Appearance of Independence and Impartiality
The continued integration between the UK and the European
Union generally, and the passing of the HRA specifically, brings the
appearance of judicial independence from Parliament into greater
relief.'57 The adoption of the HRA into British domestic law
demonstrates the increasing importance of similar governing
structures within the EU nations.'58 While the individual nations
retain their forms of national government, the protection of positive
individual rights forces the UK to separate at least the structural
dependence of the judiciary on Parliament. 5 9
While the judiciary already may be both independent and impartial
in practice, the appearance of conflict may warrant constitutional
reform. To conform to the expectations of modern European
federalism, the UK judiciary must appear independent and
impartial."6 When the UK's highest court sits in a hereditary house of
parliament an obvious potential conflict arises.16" ' In fact, the
government specifically addresses the appearance of judicial
independence with the proposal for the Supreme Court.'62
The appearance of impartiality, however, will not likely be affected
by the proposed court. Impartiality concerns the potential for bias of
an individual judge in an individual case. 163 The constitutional reforms
aimed at the appointment of judges are of greater consequence to
impartiality concerns.' 64
154. Id.
155. Supreme Court, supra note 4, 9. The Law Lords are "paid from the
Consolidated Fund not the budget of the House of Lords." Id.
156. Stevens, supra note 6, at 79.
157. The future of parliamentary sovereignty, the basis of the British constitutional
structure, is challenged by EU membership. See Lord Irvine of Lairg, supra note 38,
at 3 & n.11.
158. Vick, supra note 60, at 350; see also Ashcroft, supra note 9, at 18-19
(describing the relationship between the EU and the ECHR).
159. See Lord Irvine of Lairg, supra note 38, at 3 & n.11.
160. See id.
161. Supreme Court, supra note 4, T J 2, 3.
162. See infra Part II.A.
163. See supra Part I.D.1.
164. The appointment reforms will create a standard method for dealing with
concerns of impartiality. See A New Way of Appointing Judges, supra note 17.
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With a working understanding of judicial independence and
impartiality, this Comment details the structure of the UK's high
courts of appeal, which would be directly affected (if not supplanted)
by the proposed Supreme Court.
E. A Brief Outline of the United Kingdom's High Courts
Two courts presently divide the functions of the highest court in the
UK.'65 The Appellate Committee of the House of Lords hears
appeals from the courts of England, Wales, and Northern Ireland, as
well as civil cases in Scotland. 66 The Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council considers questions involving the devolved powers to the
Scottish Parliament, the National Assembly for Wales, and the
Northern Ireland Assembly.'67
1. The Appellate Committee of the House of Lords
The Lords of Appeal in Ordinary ("Law Lords") are members of
the House of Lords and sit on both the Appellate and Judicial
Committees."6 Currently, twelve Law Lords have been specifically
appointed under the Appellate Jurisdiction Act of 1876.169 In
addition, retired judges who are otherwise members of the House of
Lords are eligible to sit on both committees. 7° All Law Lords are full
members of the House and hold lifetime peerages. 7'
Historically, the role of the House of Lords in the judiciary
developed from Parliament and the courts of early medieval
monarchs.1 72 Attempts to formally abolish appellate jurisdiction and
165. Supreme Court, supra note 4, 2. For a general discussion, see Rodney
Brazier, Constitutional Practice 265-300 (3d ed. 1999).
166. Supreme Court, supra note 4, 2.
167. Id.
168. Id. I 3.
169. Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1876, 39 & 40 Vict., c. 59, sched. 6, 25 (Eng.),
reprinted in Sources of English Constitutional history: A Selection of Documents
From A.D. 600 to the Present, at 753 (Carl Stephenson & Frederick Marcham eds.,
1937); Supreme Court, supra note 4, 9.
170. Supreme Court, supra note 4, 91 8-9 ("[A]ny holder of high judicial office who
is a member of the House under the age of 75 is also eligible to sit."). There are
fourteen Lords who currently fit this requirement, bringing the total number of judges
allowed to sit on an appeal to the House of Lords to 26. Id. 8.
171. Id. 9.
172. Id. 10. Early advisors to the King formed a Court of Parliament which
included judges and the "lords spiritual and temporal." Id. Around the fourteenth
century, the Lords took control of appellate jurisdiction. Id. The practice fell into
disuse in the sixteenth century but was revived during the seventeenth century as
Parliament asserted its authority against the Crown. Id. The judicial work of the
Lords was so poor that by the mid-nineteenth century, the Crown began to appoint
"life peers judges" to improve the judicial functions of the House. Id. The Appellate
Jurisdiction Act 1876 confirmed the Lords' jurisdiction and allowed the appointment
of judicial life peers. Id. The right to appeal from the Court of Session to the Scottish
Parliament in civil cases was added in 1707. Id. The House of Lords' judicial role
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set up a separate court of appeal during the 1870s achieved some
limited success. 173 The Act was passed in 1873, but was never put into
effect. 174
The appellate jurisdiction of the Appellate Committee reaches most
of the UK. 175 That jurisdiction is generally discretionary. 176 Each case
is heard by a panel of five Law Lords.177 Judgments are delivered in
the Chamber of the House and are reported from the Committee to
the House. 17 The Law Lords have taken steps to remove themselves
from apparent conflict by limiting their activities in the House of
Lords. 17
2. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
The Privy Council Appeals Act of 1833180 established the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council. The Judicial Committee retains the
right to receive appeals from within the commonwealth.' The
membership of the Judicial Committee is wider than the Appellate
Committee. 182 Besides the Law Lords and all other members of the
Appellate Committee, the Judicial Committee includes other Privy
remains largely unchanged. Id. See generally Stevens, Law and Politics, supra note 48.
173. See Supreme Court, supra note 4, 10.
174. Id.
175. Id. 11. The Law Lords hear appeals from: the Courts of Appeal in England
and Wales and Northern Ireland (both civil and criminal); the Court of Session in
Scotland (civil); the High Court in England and Wales and the High Court in
Northern Ireland (criminal); the Courts-Martial Appeal Court; and, in rare cases,
certain civil cases from the High Courts in England and Wales and Northern Ireland.
Id.
176. Id. T 12. Almost all appeals require either the permission of the court below
or of the House before a party can make an appeal. Id.
177. Id. T 13.
178. Id.
179. On June 22, 2000, Lord Bingham of Cornhill announced the principles guiding
the Law Lords' participation in the House:
As full members of the House of Lords the Lords of Appeal in Ordinary
have a right to participate in the business of the House. However, mindful of
their judicial role they consider themselves bound by two general principles
when deciding whether to participate in a particular matter, or to vote: first,
the Lords of Appeal in Ordinary do not think it appropriate to engage in
matters where there is a strong element of party political controversy; and
secondly the Lords of Appeal in Ordinary bear in mind that they might
render themselves ineligible to sit judicially if they were to express an
opinion on a matter which might later be relevant to an appeal to the House.
614 Parl. Deb., H.L. (5th Ser.) (1999-2000) 419; see also Supreme Court, supra note 4,
13.
180. Privy Council Appeals Act, 1833, 3 & 4 Will., c. 41 (Eng.), reprinted in Sources
of English Constitutional History: A Selection of Documents From A.D. 600 to the
Present, at 725 (Carl Stephenson & Frederick Marcham eds., 1937).
181. Supreme Court, supra note 4, 15. Originally, the Judicial Committee heard
appeals to the sovereign in foreign and domestic cases but the judicial powers of the
Privy Council in England and Wales were abolished in 1641. Id.
182. Id. T 16.
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Counsellors who have been or are senior judges of courts with the
UK.
183
The Judicial Committee has three main functions. First, it is the
final court of appeal for many Commonwealth jurisdictions and
Crown Dependencies."8  Second, the Committee hears devolution
cases.185 Third, the Committee has technical jurisdictions, such as
appeals against pastoral schemes in the Church of England. 86 The
Judicial Committee is not affected by the proposed Supreme Court
beyond the cases concerning devolution.'87 The future of this court
structure is now the subject of prospective reform because of the
passage of the HRA, an Act of Parliament that grants the positive
individual right to a trial before an independent and impartial
tribunal.
F. The Impact of the Human Rights Act
The passage of the HRA delivered on the campaign promises that
swept the New Labour party into power. Following May 1997
elections, the New Labour government rose to power. 88 As part of its
platform, New Labour promised to reform the House of Lords, to
consider proportional representation in the House of Commons, to
devolve power to Scotland and Wales, and to incorporate the ECHR
into British domestic law.189 This last promise became a reality with
the HRA.
Before the adoption of the HRA, British citizens could only seek
redress for human rights violations from the Strasbourg Court. 9 The
court in Strasbourg questioned the independence of the British
judiciary in a series of cases.' 9 These cases focused attention on the
growing separation of powers in the UK.' 92
183. Id.
184. Id. 91 17. The Crown Dependencies include Jersey, Guernsey, and the Isle of
Man. Id.
185. Id. Devolution cases come "from the courts in Scotland, Northern Ireland or
England and Wales or directly by the UK Government or one or other of the
devolved administrations." Id. The Committee determines issues of legal competence
of the devolved organizations regarding the relevant devolution legislation. Id. For a
general discussion on devolution, see Picker, supra note 22, at 22-52 (discussing
devolution in general and devolution in Scotland specifically).
186. Id. Supreme Court, supra note 4, T 17.
187. See Supreme Court, supra note 4, T 21, 28.
188. See Stevens, supra note 83, at 368.
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. McGonnell v. United Kingdom, App. No. 28488/95, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. 289
(2000) (finding the impartiality of the Royal Court of Guernsey); see also Procola v.
Luxembourg, App. No. 27/1994, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 193 (1996) (finding the
impartiality of Judicial Committee of Conseil d'Etat).
192. Stevens, supra note 6, at 104.
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In McGonnell v. United Kingdom,193 the Strasbourg court found
that there was a lack of separation of powers that violated Article 6(1)
of the ECHR. 9 4  This line of reasoning directly questioned the
separation of powers in much of the British judiciary: The Lord
Chancellor had executive, legislative, and judicial duties while the
Lords of Appeal in Ordinary had judicial and legislative duties.'95
The muddled state of the UK's judiciary appeared prominently in
Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte
Pinochet Ugarte (No. 1).196 In October 1998, the former dictator of
Chile, General Pinochet, was arrested in the UK while receiving
medical attention. 97  The arrest warrant was challenged on the
grounds that the arresting magistrate had not met the provisions of
the Extradition Act 1989 and the sovereign immunity protected the
general. 19s The Appellate Committee panel read the requirements of
the Act broadly and held that the violation of international human
rights took precedence over the strict requirements of English law. 99
In response to these cases and political pressure, Parliament passed
the Human Rights Act of 1998, which incorporated much of the
ECHR and allowed international law to apply directly to British
domestic law. z"°
After the adoption of the HRA, defendants could argue that the
reasoning in McGonnell meant that the British judiciary failed the
independent and impartial requirements of Article 6(1) without
traveling to the Strasbourg Court."0' A few judges have agreed with
193. App. No. 28488/95, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. 289 (2000) (impartiality of the Royal
Court of Guernsey).
194. See id. The European court found that the courts of Guernsey did not meet
the standards of Article 6. Id. at 309. The court stated:
The principal judicial officer who sat on the case, the Bailiff, was not only a
senior member of the judiciary of the Island, but was also a senior member
of the legislature-as President of the States of Deliberation-and, in
addition, a senior member of the executive-as titular head of the
administration presiding over a number of important committees. It is true,
as the Government points out, that the Bailiffs other functions did not
directly impinge on his judicial duties in the case and that the Bailiff spends
most of his time in judicial functions, but the Commission considers that it is
incompatible with the requisite appearance of independence and
impartiality for a judge to have legislative and executive functions as
substantial as those in the present case.
Id. at 300-01.
195. Stevens, supra note 6, at 105.
196. 1 A.C. 61 (H.L. 1998). For a further discussion of a related case regarding the
definition of judicial impartiality, see supra notes 120-25 and accompanying text.
197. Stevens, supra note 6, at 107.
198. See id.
199. See id.
200. See Ashcroft, supra note 9, at 14-15.
201. See supra notes 191-95 and accompanying text; see also Stephen Grosz et al.,
Human Rights: The 1998 Act and the European Convention 240-41 (2000).
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them.2" Most of the Article 6(1) violations have been of two varieties:
either an executive official acts as a judge and violates the
independence requirement, or a judge is found in violation of the
impartiality requirement.21 3 While the case law impact of the Human
Rights Act has been minimized, "much of the impact of the Human
Rights Act has been psychological." 2" Rather than judges actively
declaring their dependence and partiality, political momentum led to
the government's calling for a clearer separation of powers and new
Supreme Court.
In an effort to reduce the perception of dependence, the Law Lords
have decided to refrain from legislation that they may later be called
on to adjudicate.2 6  Law Lords speak rarely to avoid the risk of
challenges in the Appellate Committee.27 The Law Lords have acted
affirmatively to maintain the appearance of impartiality and
independence, but the current system still allows for the Law Lords to
take an active role in the legislative process.20 8 It is that potential and
apparent conflict which the Supreme Court proposal addresses.
II. CREATING AN INDEPENDENT AND IMPARTIAL HIGH COURT
The proposed Supreme Court focuses on the issues of the
distribution of governing powers and the proper judicial role. To
analyze the impact of the proposal for a Supreme Court, this part
presents the current proposal and then formulates answers to two
related questions. First, does judicial independence require a separate
branch of government? 29  Second, if judicial independence does
require a separate branch, does that separate court need the power to
review and overturn legislation?
210
202. Regina (Alconbury Developments Ltd.) v. Sec'y of State for the Env't, 2 A.C.
295 (H.L. 2003) (holding the Department of the Environment, Transport and the
Regions was not "independent and impartial" under Article 6); see also supra notes
116-50 and accompanying text.
203. See Grosz, supra note 201, at 240-41.
204. Stevens, supra note 6, at 114.
205. See generally Lord Steyn, supra note 7.
206. Supreme Court, supra note 4, $ 3.
207. See Lord Steyn, supra note 7, at 383. Over the last three years, Law Lords
have spoken in the House of Lords on only a handful of occasions:
In 2000 a Scottish Law Lord spoke three times. No other Lord of Appeal in
Ordinary spoke in that year. In 2001 the same Scottish Law Lord spoke
twice, both on debates on reports of the European Union Committee which
he had chaired. In 2001 a [sic] English Law Lord made a maiden speech
which enabled him to speak to the Hunting Bill.
Id. at 383-84.
208. Id. at 384.
209. This question and the following one are footnoted for ease of reference. Part
II.B will answer no to this question, while Parts II.C and III will respond
affirmatively.
210. This question only follows an affirmative answer to the first question. Thus,
Part II.B does not reach the question of judicial review. Part II.C will answer no to
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This part outlines commentators' alternative answers to these
questions. Part II.B answers no to the first question and finds that a
Supreme Court is unnecessary because the current judiciary is already
functionally independent.21' In Part II.C, commentators replied that
judicial independence does require a Supreme Court and contend that
the government's proposal succeeds in creating an independent and
impartial judiciary without an additional grant of enhanced judicial
review. 212 Before exploring these questions and alternative answers,
this Comment presents the government's proposal.
A. The Supreme Court Proposal
Part II.A outlines the government's Supreme Court proposal, which
incorporates the topics discussed in Part I and sets the stage for the
analysis in Parts II.B, II.C, and III. This part traces the impetus for
reform and describes the government's proposal to separate the
legislative and judicial functions in the House of Lords.
1. Political Action
The constitutional reforms initiated by the Labour government
largely moot the question of whether Britain's judiciary is
independent of Parliament. On June 12, 2003, the Labour Party
announced its intention to establish a Supreme Court.2 3  The
government also announced the abolition of the Lord Chancellor's
position and the creation of the Department of Constitutional
Affairs.214 The announcements were met with both confusion and
215surprise.
this question and limit judicial review to the organic growth experience following the
HRA passage. Part III argues that the vigorous ability to overturn legislation must be
part of the Supreme Court proposal.
211. See infra Part II.B.
212. See infra Part II.C. Part III responds affirmatively to both questions and
suggests that the Supreme Court fails to establish independence and impartiality
without an expansion of judicial powers. See infra Part III.
213. See Supreme Court, supra note 4, 1.
214. See, e.g., Colin Brown, Blair Forced Irvine to Resign in Humiliating Reshuffle
Row, Sunday Telegraph (London), June 15, 2003, at 2; Patrick Wintour & Clare Dyer,
Blair's Reforming Reshuffle: Job of Lord Chancellor Abolished After 1,400 Years:
Law Lords to be Replaced by US-Style Supreme Court.: Falconer Gets New Post Amid
Claims of Botch Up, The Guardian (London), June 13, 2003, at I (finding the
announcement of the abolition of the Lord Chancellor and the creation of the
Department of Constitutional Affairs to be surprising, ill-prepared ideas). The
abolition was subsequently turned into a demotion, effectively stripping the position
of its judicial and executive responsibilities. Reforming the Office of the Lord
Chancellor, supra note 17, TT 6-10.
215. See, e.g., Andrew Murray, Cabinet Chaos Rules Supreme; Constitutional
Muddle Erupts Over Ministerial Musical Chairs, Morning Star (London), June 14,
2003, at 1; The Prime Minister Himself Should Try to Explain What is Going on, The
Independent (London), June 16, 2003, at 12.
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The government has recently reasserted its desire to proceed with
the court reforms. In his December 8, 2003 speech, Lord Falconer
reaffirmed the government's commitment to strengthening judicial
independence.21' This Comment attempts to tease out the reasons for
a Supreme Court and its impact on the UK judiciary.217
2. The Proposed Supreme Court
The government proposes to terminate the judicial functions of the
House of Lords and create a new high court for the UK.218 In its
proposal for a new Supreme Court, the government declared: "[We]
will legislate to abolish the jurisdiction of the House of Lords within
the UK's judicial system .... [All appellate functions] will be vested
instead in a new Supreme Court, quite separate from Parliament., 21 9
The announcement signaled an intention to more clearly delineate the
separation of powers in the UK.22' Lord Falconer recently outlined
the importance of judicial independence when describing the need for
a Supreme Court. 21
The proposal attempts to centralize the judicial system while
maintaining the supremacy of Parliament.22 The proposal clearly
216. Falconer, supra note 6. Lord Falconer emphasized the importance of the
Supreme Court proposal: "I believe that judicial independence is so important, so
vital to this country, that it now needs to be enshrined in law. That is what I
announced last week. That is what will be in the legislation which we will bring
forward." Id.
217. The proposed judicial reform contains two separate considerations: The
appointment of judges and the establishment of a Supreme Court. Id. For the
government's proposal to reform the appointment of judges, see A New Way of
Appointing Judges, supra note 17.
218. Supreme Court, supra note 4, 1 (noting the influence of recent calls to
reform the judiciary). The paragraph states:
There have been a number of calls for such a change in recent years, for
example by the Senior Law Lord, Lord Bingham of Cornhill, in his
Constitution Unit Lecture in May 2002, in which he said "Our object is plain
enough: to ensure that our supreme court is so structured and equipped as
best to fulfil its functions and to command the confidence of the country in
the changed world in which we live." The Chairman of the Bar Council, in
an article in The Times on 2 April 2003, said "Judges should have no part of
the legislature .... It is very difficult to understand why our Supreme Court
(the law lords) should be a committee of the second house of Parliament."
Id.
219. Id. 18.
220. See id. i (stating that "[t]he intention is that the new Court will put the
relationship between the executive, the legislature and the judiciary on a modern
footing, which takes account of people's expectations about the independence and
transparency of the judicial system"). The last clause clearly indicates the political
motivation of the Government rather than a strict concern for the judicial
interpretation of "independent and impartial." Id.
221. See Falconer, supra note 6.
222. The Supreme Court proposal states:
The establishment of the new Court accordingly gives us the opportunity to
restore a single apex to the UK's judicial system where all the constitutional
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retains the concept of parliamentary sovereignty and refuses to grant
the power to overturn legislation.223 The new Court would not affect
the jurisdiction of the Judicial Committee regarding overseas claims.224
Regarding the membership of the Court, the government proposed
transferring the current twelve Law Lords as the initial members of
the new Court.2 5
The relationship with the House of Lords would be severed.226
Some commentators argued that the Law Lords benefit from listening
to first hand accounts of deliberations in Parliament.227 However, the
government wants "to sever completely any connection between the
Court and the House of Lords., 228 The proposal considers whether
the new Court members should have the same responsibilities as they
did when they were Law Lords.229 The government also proposes that
the administration of the new Court should come under the
Department of Constitutional Affairs.230
The government proposes two broad methods of selecting future
members of the Court. First, membership to the Court would be
made as an appointment by the Queen on the advice of her
ministers.23 1 The second option suggests a new transparent process of
identifying names by an Appointments Commission with ultimate
approval by the Prime Minister. 32 The proposal leaves open for
issues can be considered.... A Supreme Court along the United States
model, or a Constitutional Court on the lines of some other European
countries would be a departure from the UK's constitutional traditions.
Supreme Court, supra note 4, IT 20, 23. Paragraph 23 distinguishes the English
proposal from the American Supreme Court by stating that the English Court would
not have the power "to strike down and annul congressional legislation." Id. 23 "In
our democracy, Parliament is supreme. There is no separate body of constitutional
law which takes precedence over all other law." Id.
223. See id. at Executive Summary, 20, 23.
224. See id. 28.
225. See id. 29. However, the current practice of the Law Lords meeting as a
panel of five is up for discussion as is the ultimate number of judges necessary for the
high court. Id. 31.
226. See id. T1 34 ("The primary objective of the new arrangements is to establish
the Court as a body separate from Parliament.").
227. See id. $ 35.
228. Id. $ 36.
229. See id. 57 (finding that the "[t]he Government does not see any need to
make special arrangements to preserve any interest of the Law Lords in [their House
of Lords committee responsibilities]").
230. Id. 64. This apparent shift of administration to the executive branch seems
fraught with the same separation powers as before and further seems to directly
contradict the definition of independence from the European Court of Human
Rights. This issue will be discussed at length in Part III.A.
231. Id. $ 39. One obvious impact of this is the Prime Minister appointing judges,
which parallels the executive nomination found in the United States. But involving
the Queen goes against the clear separation of powers sought in the proposal's
preamble.
232. Id. 40. This option is aimed at incorporating the methods discussed in the
proposal for nominating judges. See A New Way of Appointing Judges, supra note 17.
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discussion the qualifications, tenure, and criteria for selection of
future justices.233 The government has also left open for discussion the
operation of the Supreme Court, preferring instead to seek public
comment on general structure and appearance concerns.234
Much of the proposal concerns issues of appearance and practical
concern. The proposal discusses possible titles for the new judges on
the Court. 5 The new court will not usurp the power devolved to
certain jurisdictions.2 36  As in the segregated account for the Law
Lords, the current proposal calls for the funding to come from a
general Parliament account.237 The proposal concludes by addressing
the administrative needs of the new court.238 While the Appellate
Committees' administrative tasks are provided by the House of
Lords,239 the proposal suggests shifting the administration and budget
for the Supreme Court to the Department of Constitutional Affairs.24°
Having outlined the Supreme Court proposal, this Comment details
commentators' alternative answers to the questions concerning the
necessity of the court and what powers it should have. Scholars in
Part II.B questioned whether the proposal and separation are
necessary. Advocates cited in Part II.C find that the proposal is
necessary under the increased separation of powers, but they do not
conclude that the Court needs additional powers of review and
overturning legislation.
B. The Judiciary Is Already Functionally Independent
Although political action has effectively decided that reform must
take place to remove "anything which might undermine the
independence or impartiality of a judicial tribunal, '2 41 the future of
British constitutional reform is always uncertain.242 Some scholars
contend that the British judiciary is already independent.243  This
233. See Supreme Court, supra note 4, $$ 44-49.
234. See id. 1$ 50-56 (discussing alternatives such as discretionary review, sitting en
banc or in a panel, and questioning how cases should be appealed to the high court).
235. See id. [ 58-59.
236. See id. 61. The jurisdictions affected include: the Lord Chief Justice of
England and Wales, the Lord President of the Court of Session in Scotland, and the
Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland. Id. $ 61 & n.4.
237. See id. 63.
238. See id. $$ 63-67.
239. See id. 63.
240. Id. 64.
241. Id. 91 3.
242. See, e.g., Russell, supra note 43, at 339 ("It is easier to get a constitutional
[change] ... on the political agenda than it is to win. The predominant patter- is one
of frustrated demands." (citation omitted)); A Lost Opportunity for the Government
to Regain its Momentum [hereinafter Lost Opportunity], The Independent (London),
Nov. 27, 2003, at 20.
243. See, e.g., Stevens, supra note 6, at 79-82 (finding that individual judges rarely
face questions of independence); Barendt, supra note 86, at 615 (observing that the
judicial branch is independent from Parliament and the executive with some
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argument focuses on the independence of individual judges and the
balance of powers doctrine.2 " While the same criteria for evaluating
independence apply to lower courts, Part II.B focuses on the
independence of the Law Lords.
1. Independence of Individual Judges
Many commentators believe that the British judiciary has
maintained independence and impartiality. Particularly in the case of
individual judges' ability to decide a given case, British judges enjoy
functional independence. 245 Robert Stevens, in his 2001 book on the
English judiciary, outlined this argument of functional
independence. 246  He noted that the "hallmarks" of judicial
independence are "security of tenure, fiscal independence ... and
freedom from executive pressure.,
247
By applying these standards to the Law Lords, proponents conclude
that the individual judges are functionally independent. First, the Law
Lords have security of tenure. As members of the House of Lords,
the Law Lords have membership for life.248  The financial
independence of Law Lords is a second criterion for judicial
independence.249  A financially independent judiciary will not "be
prone to temptation" so the government takes care to provide for "an
adequate, if not opulent, salary. ' 250  The Supreme Court proposal
includes the current funding of the Law Lords and makes provisions
for similar support, although the funds and administrative support
would come from a Cabinet department rather than Parliament.2 5
1
Thus, the commitment to providing a financially secure judiciary runs
throughout English tradition and is continued in the Supreme Court
proposal.
The third of Stevens's "hallmarks of independence," freedom from
political pressure, presented the greatest challenge to the perception
of judicial independence.252 The standard procedure for removal of a
Law Lord requires an impeachment process from both Houses of
Parliament. 253  Despite that requirement, Stevens observed that
exceptions).
244. Stevens, supra note 6, at 85-88.
245. See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
246. See Stevens, supra note 6, at 79-82.
247. Id. at 79.
248. See Brazier, supra note 36, at 237-38; Russell, supra note 43, at 10; Supreme
Court, supra note 4, 9. In fact, even Lords who have been criminally convicted are
able to return to the House of Lords after serving their time.
249. See Stevens, supra note 6, at 81.
250. See id.
251. Supreme Court, supra note 4, 63-64.
252. See Stevens, supra note 6, at 80 ("Judicial protection from politicians and
political winds is, however, significantly by tradition.").
253. See Act of Settlement, 1701, 12 & 13 Will. 3, c. 2 (Eng.), reprinted in Sources of
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"[j]udges have been eased out from time to time. '  Two Law Lords
were forced out by the Lord Chancellor in the last two decades,
largely due to pressure from the executive. 255  But generally the
safeguards of the Act of Settlement have provided for remarkable
security.256 This security demonstrates that the moderate actions of
the balance of powers can adequately adjust to preserve judicial
independence. 7
Eric Barendt, in a 1995 article, observed that the judiciary is already
functionally separate from the executive and legislative powers.258 He
finds that the Act of Settlement prevents judges from sitting in the
House of Commons-the effective seat of parliamentary power.25 9 In
addition, lay peers are prevented from participating in judicial
proceedings in the House of Lords.2 ° Barendt also noted that the
Law Lords have the freedom to participate in legislative debates, but
he concludes that this contravention of an independent judiciary is
"moderate[] and perhaps acceptabl[e].1 26 1  The scope of judicial
independence is also affected by the related concepts of parliamentary
sovereignty and the balance of powers.
Parliamentary power limits the judicial role and allows for a lesser
judicial independence without the right to overturn legislation. The
rise of parliamentary supremacy under George I and George II
decreased the role of the judiciary.262 Parliamentary sovereignty, by
reducing the judiciary to a less controversial role, protected the
perception of judicial independence.263  The consolidation of
governing power in the House of Commons after 1832 further
reduced the role of the judiciary.2 4 Since the judiciary is inferior to
Parliament, the democratic process will adjust to protect individual
freedoms.265 This concept of parliamentary sovereignty and the belief
that the balance of powers works to protect individual rights prevents
the creation of a separate judicial branch.266
English Constitutional History: A Selection of Documents From A.D. 600 to the
Present, at 610 (Carl Stephenson & Frederick Marcham eds., 1937).
254. Stevens, supra note 6, at 80 (internal quotation marks omitted).
255. Id. (Lord Chief Justice Widgery and Lord Denning were forced out by the
Lord Chancellor under Edward Heath and Margaret Thatcher).
256. See id. at 79-80.
257. See infra Part II.A.2; see also supra Part I.B.2.
258. Barendt, supra note 86, at 615.
259. Id. Note, however, that this emphasis on the House of Commons would not
function as well to maintain judicial independence if the House of Lords reforms are
carried out. See Russell, supra note 43, at 260-92; HOL's Next Step, supra note 17.
260. Barendt, supra note 86, at 615.
261. Id. It is these latter freedoms that the Supreme Court proposal views as
impermissible. See Supreme Court, supra note 4, 1.
262. See Stevens, supra note 6, at 79.
263. See id.
264. See id.
265. Vick, supra note 60, at 341.
266. See Stevens, Loss of Innocence, supra note 83, at 392 & n.125.
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2. The Balance of Powers Works
The doctrines of parliamentary sovereignty and the balance of
powers have dominated the conception of the British government.267
Rather than formally specifying and separating the functional powers
of government, the UK favors a benign state that is wholly derived
from the Houses of Parliament. 268 The balance of powers doctrine
rests on the premise that the British Government works without a
strict separation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers.269 The
Prime Minister serves as both the functional head of the executive and
as the leader of the dominant party in Parliament.27° Similarly, the
Law Lords serve as the head of the judiciary in the Appellate
Committee in Ordinary and as legislative members of the House of
Lords. 7 ' Despite this apparent conflict between legislative and
judicial powers, the British judiciary in general, and the Law Lords in
particular, have taken steps to ensure independence and
impartiality.272  This incremental change is more in line with
traditional constitutional development and the doctrine of balance of
powers.273
The balance of powers does not prevent judicial independence and
activism. Despite their presence in the House of Lords, the Law
Lords have held that British legislation was unenforceable - a
moderate step towards overturning legislation. For example, in
Regina v. Secretary of State for Employment, ex parte Equal
Opportunities Commission ,274 "the House of Lords held that British
legislation relating to part-time employees violated European
Directives and was therefore unenforceable. 2 75 The public response
was swift with The Times writing that "Britain may now have, for the
first time in its history, a constitutional court. '276 Indeed, the power of
judges to interpret legislation in line with the HRA gives more judicial
discretion, 277  and the proposed Supreme Court would not
meaningfully change judicial power.278 Notably, all of this growth has
267. See Stevens, supra note 6, at 89-99; Vick, supra note 60, at 351 (noting the
governments' reluctance to "deviat[e] from traditional Diceyan conceptions of
parliamentary sovereignty").
268. See Stevens, supra note 6, at 79.
269. Id. at 85.
270. Vick, supra note 60, at 342 & n.94.
271. See id. at n.97; see also Supreme Court, supra note 4, 2.
272. See, e.g., Lord Steyn, supra note 7, at 383; Supreme Court, supra note 4, 3.
273. See Vick, supra note 60, at 342 (describing most British constitutional change
as incremental); Russell, supra note 43, at 339 (noting the difficulty in reforming the
House of Lords due to political pressure).
274. 1 A.C. 1 (H.L. 1995).
275. Stevens, Loss of Innocence, supra note 83, at 395.
276. Id. (citing Profound Judgment: How the Law Lords Tipped Britain's
Constsitutional Balance, The Times (London), Mar. 5, 1994 (quotations omitted)).
277. See Vick, supra note 60, at 366-67.
278. See Supreme Court, supra note 4, 22-23 (stating that "[a]part from this, the
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occurred within the balance of powers paradigm of the shared
democratic process."'
Traditionally, parliamentary sovereignty ensured the protection of
individual freedoms through "self-correcting democracy, according to
which the protection of individuals' rights was effected by the political
mechanisms of ministerial responsibility and parliamentary
scrutiny."280  This reliance on the democratic process represents a
contrast to positive protection of rights as in the U.S. Bill of Rights,
but "Parliament has not betrayed this trust." '281
The HRA may present a direct challenge to parliamentary
sovereignty regarding the recognition of individual rights. 82 Until the
Labour reforms of 1997, it was fairly settled that the English judges
were not a separate branch of government and did not share power
equally with the executive or Parliament.283 Stevens noted that the
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty effectively ensured that
separate branches of government did not exist. 28  This emphasis on
individual rights and particularly the right to an independent and
impartial tribunal have created concerns regarding the appearance of
judicial independence. 285 Because of these concerns, the government
answers286 that the highest court of appeal should be separated from
Parliament, and Part I.C discusses that answer.2 87
C. The Government's Modest Proposal for Structural Independence
While Part II.B considered that there may be no need to reform the
current judicial system, Part II.C.1 explores the government's decision
to establish a Supreme Court separate from Parliament.288 The
government's proposal suggests that a separation of the judiciary from
Parliament is necessary.289 Part II.C.2 outlines the government's
negative answer 290 to the second question of judicial review291 and
Government does not propose any further changes in the role of the new Supreme
Court" and does not authorize the power to overturn legislation).
279. See Vick, supra note 60, at 365-67. However, Vick concludes that this growth
results from a compromise between the balance of powers and a recognition of
individual rights more in line with the separation of powers. Id. at 372.
280. Lord Irvine of Lairg, supra note 38, at 16; see also supra Part I.B.
281. See Vick, supra note 60, at 341 & nn.84-85 ("'We have entrusted our most
fundamental liberties to the will of a sovereign Parliament and, taken all in all,
Parliament has not betrayed this trust."' (quoting Lord Hoffmann, Human Rights and
the House of Lords, 62 Mod. L. Rev. 159, 161 (1999))).
282. See Vick, supra note 60, at 341-42; see also infra Part III.C.2.
283. See Stevens, supra note 6, at 89.
284. See id.
285. See supra Part II.A.
286. See supra notes 209-10 and accompanying text.
287. See infra Part II.C.
288. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
289. See infra Part II.C.1.
290. See infra Part II.C.2.
291. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
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finds that the Supreme Court does not need the power to overturn
legislation based on the longstanding principle of parliamentary
sovereignty.292
Despite confidence in the present system, the Supreme Court
proposal notes serious concerns over the appearance of judicial
independence do exist.293  An article in The Times quoted the
Chairman of the Bar Council as saying, "It is very difficult to
understand why our Supreme Court (the law lords) should be a
committee of the second house of Parliament. 294 Lord Johan Steyn
has argued that an independent and impartial judiciary needs a
Supreme Court separate from Parliament.295  His article found two
problems with judicial independence in the Appellate Committee:
first, allowing the Lord Chancellor to hold executive, legislative, and
judicial powers, and second, "that serving Law Lords may speak and
vote on legislative business in the House of Lords. ' 296 Lord Steyn's
article focused its strong invective on the former concern, and the
government has agreed and has acted to remove the position of the
Lord Chancellor. The Supreme Court proposal addresses Lord
Steyn's latter concern.297
1. The Government Believes that the Judiciary Should Be Separate
from the Legislature
To the first guiding question on whether securing judicial
independence requires a separate branch of government, the
government answers that the judicial functions of the House of Lords
should be separated from Parliament. Lord Steyn's second obstacle,
the Law Lords' potential legislative powers, has led to the proposed
establishment of a Supreme Court.2 98 With its Supreme Court
proposal, the government has made a strong statement concerning a
strict separation of powers in the UK: "[T]he time has come to
292. See infra Part II.C.2.
293. Supreme Court, supra note 4, IT 2-3.
294. Supreme Court, supra note 4, 1.
295. See Lord Steyn, supra note 7.
296. Id. The article focuses mostly on the role of the Lord Chancellor: "The major
obstacle to creating a Supreme Court is the privilege of the Lord Chancellor of sitting
in the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords." Id. at 383.
297. See Supreme Court, supra note 4, 1 1. The first problem was handled by
abolishing the position of Lord Chancellor. However, the 'abolition' of the Lord
Chancellorship has proven more difficult than first thought. Currently, Lord Falconer
as head of the Department of Constitutional Affairs maintains all powers previously
granted to the Lord Chancellor. Because this issue is largely outside the scope of the
Supreme Court proposal and this Comment, for further reading see Lord Steyn, supra
note 7; Reforming the Office of the Lord Chancellor, supra note 17.
298. See Supreme Court, supra note 4, at Foreword; Lord Steyn, supra note 7, at
383, 396.
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establish a new court regulated by statute as a body separate from
Parliament." '299
While, in practice, the British judiciary may function independently
and impartially, it still appears structurally dependent-the Law Lords
sit in the House of Lords °.3  The Law Lords have acknowledged the
problem and limited their involvement in matters of purely legislative
importance. 3°" But Law Lords retain their peerages in the House of
Lords, occasionally sit in on legislative hearings, and have no official
bar to further escalating their legislative activities.3°2  It is this
dependent appearance that the Supreme Court proposal seeks to
rectify. °3
Because the government believes that the problem lies only in the
appearance of independence, the proposal offers only cosmetic
remedies."° For the government, the doctrine of parliamentary
sovereignty can coexist with the expanded separation of powers
doctrine found in the current reforms. This coexistence is premised
upon a judiciary without the power of judicial review. 305 The Supreme
Court proposal explicitly retains the doctrine of parliamentary
sovereignty by granting the sole power to amend legislation to
Parliament.3 6 The government views the Appellate Committee as
functionally independent and believes that solidifying its structural
separation from Parliament will enhance the perception of judicial
independence.3 7
299. Supreme Court, supra note 4, at Foreword.
300. Supreme Court, supra note 4, 3.
Paragraph three states:
It is not always understood that the decisions of the 'House of Lords' are in
practice decisions of the Appellate Committee and that non-judicial
members of the House never take part in the judgments. Nor is [their
restraint] from getting involved in political issues ... which they might later
have to adjudicate always appreciated.
Id. This misunderstanding "add[s] to the perception that [the Law Lords']
independence might be compromised by the arrangements." Id.
301. Lord Steyn argues that while the privilege of Law Lords to take part in
legislative business is "no longer defensible," it has "wither[ed] away" naturally. Lord
Steyn, supra note 7, at 383-84. But see Stevens, supra note 6, at 93-94 (noting the Law
Lords' tendency to speak on political matters in the House of Lords).
302. See Lord Steyn, supra note 7, at 383; see also Supreme Court, supra note 4, at
Executive Summary (addressing this very concern: "The [Law Lords] would cease,
while members of the Court, to be able to sit and vote in the House of Lords").
303. Supreme Court, supra note 4, at Foreword.
304. See supra Part II.A.
305. See Goldsworthy, supra note 39, at 277-78.
306. Supreme Court, supra note 4, 23. Paragraph twenty-three states:
In our democracy, Parliament is supreme. There is no separate body of
constitutional law which takes precedence over all other law. The
constitution is made up of the whole body of the laws and settled practice
and convention [subject to the whim of a reforming Prime Minister], all of
which can be amended or repealed by Parliament.
Id.
307. Supreme Court, supra note 4, at Foreword, 23.
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The structural changes offered by the government focus on
removing any perception of judicial dependence on Parliament.3 8
The government proposal argues that by severing the remaining ties
of the Law Lords with the House of Lords, the new Supreme Court
will satisfy the independent and impartial requirement of the HRA.3 °9
The proposed Supreme Court will end the association of the highest
court with the House of Lords.31° The Supreme Court judges will no
longer sit in on legislative hearings."' The Supreme Court proposal
ends the judiciary's relationship with Parliament because of
perceptions that the Appellate Committee is not independent of
Parliament.312
The government thus answers that the judicial functions of the
House of Lords should be separated from Parliament; however, since
the government wants to maintain the doctrine of parliamentary
sovereignty, Part II.C.2 finds that the Supreme Court does not need
vigorous judicial review.
2. But the Government Says No to Judicial Review
While the current proposal finds that the Supreme Court is
necessary to ensure the appearance of judicial independence, the
government firmly rejects the idea of the judicial power to overturn
Acts of Parliament.313 The current proposal for the Supreme Court
separates the structure but does not expand the powers of the
Appellate Committee.314 The proposal seeks to create a court
separate from the executive and legislative branches of government.315
The Law Lords act as the court of last appeal, but they do not have
the power to overturn legislation.316 Rather, the Law Lords have the
power to recommend that Parliament remove the legislation.3"' The
new court would not gain any powers not held by the Law Lords.318
The passage of the HRA and the constitutional reforms instituted
by the Labour Party have signaled a move towards a separation of
powers.31 9 But even the rush of reform instituted by New Labour will
308. See id. 3.
309. See id. 2-3.
310. See id.
311. See id. 34-37.
312. See id. 3 ("[T]he requirement for the appearance of... independence...
increasingly limits the ability of the Law Lords to contribute to the work of the House
of Lords."). Impartiality, while an important concern and addressed by reform of the
appointment process, is not directly impacted by establishing a Supreme Court.
313. Supreme Court, supra note 4, at Executive Summary.
314. See supra Part II.A.
315. Supreme Court, supra note 4, 18.
316. See Vick, supra note 60, at 331.
317. See Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 3-4 (Eng.), available at
http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/8004 2 - d.htm.
318. See Supreme Court, supra note 4, 22.
319. See id. at Foreword ("The Government believes that [establishing a Supreme
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not reinvent the rate of British constitutional growth. In his article
looking at the growth of a separation of powers and its effect on the
judiciary, Robert Stevens concluded: "Despite the new political
responsibilities and irrespective of the need, Britain will not suddenly
embrace three clear branches of government. The growth will be
organic and will constantly be delayed by the tradition of
parliamentary sovereignty.""32 And the HRA itself remains in force
only with the approval of Parliament.321 Without recognizing the
HRA as a constitutional document beyond the reach of an altered
Parliament, the legislation could simply be removed and the positive
recognition of individual rights would return to the background.322
Scholars noted that even without the power to invalidate legislation,
courts have significant power under the HRA.32 3 In his article
discussing the HRA's impact on the British Constitution, Professor
Douglas Vick found that the courts' power to review legislation was
expanded by the HRA.3 24 This shift in how courts interpret legislation
moves the judicial system "much closer" to the Constitutional
inquiries made by the constitutional courts of continental Europe and
the U.S. Supreme Court.325 Vick also found that the powers of British
courts will be increased by introducing the principle of proportionality
into the judicial review of executive actions.326 Such organic change
represented a compromise between allowing courts to enforce
individual rights and maintaining parliamentary sovereignty.3 27
Part III argues that the viewpoint explained in Part II.C is correct in
asserting the need for a Supreme Court, but for the wrong reasons.
Part III.A agrees with the government that the judiciary should be
separate from Parliament but highlights the weaknesses in the
government's argument.328 Part III.B shows that the government has
Court] will reflect and enhance the independence of the Judiciary from both the
legislature and the executive.").
320. Stevens, supra note 83, at 401.
321. Granting heightened constitutional status to the HRA and thus protecting the
legislation from arbitrary change by Parliament is an important issue, but again
largely outside the scope of this Comment. For further reading, see generally Robert
Blackburn, Towards a Constitutional Bill of Rights for the United Kingdom:
Commentary and Documents (1999).
322. See Vick, supra note 60, at 330 ("[I]t can be repealed by a simple majority vote
in the House of Commons.").
323. See Id., at 366.
324. Id. (describing the Lord Chancellor's comments regarding the impact of the
HRA). According to the Lord Chancellor, the HRA allowed courts to adopt a
"purposive approach to legislative interpretation" that "involves a process of
moulding the law to what the Court believes the law should be trying to achieve." Id.
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
325. Id.
326. See id. at 367.
327. See id. at 372.
328. See infra Part III.A.
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taken affirmative steps towards adopting a separation of powers.329
Finally, Part III.C argues that the new court must have the power of
judicial review to ensure judicial independence and prevent an
imbalance in governing powers.33 °
III. A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY TO STRENGTHEN THE FOUNDATIONS
OF THE UK GOVERNMENT
To frame the discussion, Part II asked whether judicial
independence requires a court separate from Parliament331 and, if so,
whether that court needed the power to review and overturn
legislation.332 Part III argues that the answers given in Parts II.A and
II.B do not adequately address the constitutional problems that the
HRA exposes and that a powerful Supreme Court could remedy.
While the proposed Supreme Court represents a modest proposal to
separate the UK's highest court from the rest of government,333
effective and meaningful separation requires a careful balancing of
Parliament's power.
This part agrees with the government that judicial independence
does require a separate branch of government.334 However, this
Comment reaches the same answer through differing reasoning:
Rather than solving merely the appearance of independence,
removing the Law Lords from the House of Lords maintains actual
judicial independence.335 This part moves beyond the government's
proposal and suggests that judicial review is necessary to protect
individual rights.
329. See infra Part III.B.
330. See infra Part III.C.
331. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
332. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
333. Supreme Court, supra note 4, $$ 1, 7 (describing the Supreme Court as part of
packaged reforms to "put the relationship between the executive, the legislature and
the judiciary on a modern footing"). The proposed judicial changes aim to eliminate
the appearance of independence of the Law Lords as judges and potential legislators.
See id. J 3. The modesty of the court proposal seemingly conflicts with the sweeping
changes envisioned in the government's reforms. This conflict is particularly evident
in the degree of change necessary to make the House of Lords into an elected,
bicameral legislative house on much more equal footing with the House of Commons.
Russell, supra note 43, at 107-92 (outlining the dramatic changes necessary to create a
functional upper chamber of Parliament); see also Robert Hazell, Reforming the
House of Lords: A Step by Step Guide, in Constitutional Reform in the United
Kingdom: Practice and Principles 129, 138-39 (Univ. of Cambridge Centre for Public
Law 1998).
334. See supra note 209 and accompanying text; supra Part II.B.
335. See infra Parts III.A-B.
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A. An Opportunity to Separate Governmental Powers
This part first agrees that the judiciary should be separated from
Parliament. Then, Part III.A.2 argues that mere separation of
structure would wreck the balance of powers.
In an effort to fulfill campaign promises and secure its legacy, the
New Labour government has sought to separate the judicial functions
of the Law Lords from the rest of the House of Lords.336 This attempt
had the modest aim of structural reform by removing the appearance
of dependence on Parliament.337 The reform process, however, has
highlighted a deeper structural problem with the UK Government,
i.e., that parliamentary sovereignty effectively precludes the judiciary
from balancing the executive and legislative powers.338 But before
addressing this structural fault, this Comment agrees with the
government proposal that ending the judicial functions of the House
of Lords is the correct first step to strengthen the British
constitutional framework.339
1. A Supreme Court Separate From Parliament
The government has proposed the separation of the UK's highest
court from the legislature.340 The government argues that the
judiciary must be separate from the House of Lords to ensure the
appearance of independence.34' While separation would help with the
appearance of independence, there are more serious problems with
judicial independence than can be resolved by simply removing the
Law Lords from the House of Lords.
First, the HRA, representing an increased concern in positively
recognizing individual rights, requires an independent and impartial
tribunal.342 The Strasbourg Court required that a court must be
independent of the executive.3 43  The Supreme Court proposal
maintains that parliamentary sovereignty remains the guiding
principle for the UK, i.e., no body of law and governmental or judicial
action can explicitly overrule an Act of Parliament.3" Under
parliamentary sovereignty and the related doctrine of balance of
powers, there is no formal separation of the executive and legislature;
the Prime Minister is, first, a Member of Parliament and, second, an
336. See Supreme Court, supra note 4, 1; see also supra Part II.A.
337. See Supreme Court, supra note 4, TT 2-3.
338. See infra Part III.B.
339. See infra Parts III.A.1-2.
340. See Supreme Court, supra note 4, T 7; see also supra Part II.C.
341. See supra Part I1.C.1.
342. See Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, sched. 1, art. 6(1) (Eng.), available at
http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/actsl998/80042-d.htm; Gordon & Ward,
supra note 116, at 183-86.
343. See text accompanying note 141.
344. Supreme Court, supra note 4, T 23.
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increasingly presidential executive.345 One could logically conclude
that leaving the high court within the House of Lords would explicitly
conflict with the requirements of the HRA.346 A Supreme Court
outside of the House of Lords thus could alleviate this threat to
judicial independence.
But the government proposal ineffectively addresses this concern
because it may contain a facial violation of independence from the
executive requirement.347  In paragraph sixty-four of the Supreme
Court proposal, the government proposes that the administration of
the court should be shifted from the House of Lords to the
Department of Constitutional Affairs.348 Even if the government
rightly believes that the balance of powers allows for a sufficiently
independent judiciary, paragraph sixty-four would place the Supreme
Court in direct contact with the executive power.349
In addition to violating the specific provisions of the HRA, the
Paragraph Sixty-Four actions would violate Robert Stevens's
traditional hallmarks of judicial independence.5 The funding and
administrative support of the high court would allow for direct
influence by the executive, who arguably could curtail the activities of
the Supreme Court.351 This sort of executive involvement closely
resembles the administrative action that has repeatedly failed the
Article 6(1) independence requirements. 2 The role of the executive
in Parliament and its relation to the judiciary must be carefully
balanced if judicial independence and individual rights are to be
preserved.
345. See Barendt, supra note 86, at 614-15; see also supra notes 62-70 and
accompanying text.
346. That is to say, the HRA does not specifically require judicial independence
from the legislature. But because the legislature and executive are interwoven in the
UK system, a judicial role in Parliament is not necessarily independent of the Prime
Minister. This conflict may be muted now because of the appointed nature and
limited role of the House of Lords, but the conflict would increase greatly as the
proposed reforms continue and the House of Lords becomes an elected chamber.
347. The HRA specifically requires independence from the executive. Gordon &
Ward, supra note 116, at 185-86. Recall the discussion of judicial independence in
Part I.D where this Comment noted the importance of judicial independence from the
executive. See supra Part I.D.
348. Supreme Court, supra note 4, 64.
349. Not only would the administration of the Supreme Court be the responsibility
of a Cabinet office, the salary for the judges would be paid from Department of
Constitutional Affairs accounts. Id. 66.
350. Stevens, supra note 6, at 79; see text accompanying notes 151-56.
351. Cf. Supreme Court, supra note 4, 64-65 (transferring the administrative
tasks of the court from the House of Lords to the Department of Constitutional
Affairs). Theoretically, if the executive disapproved of a Supreme Court action, it
could punitively sanction the Court by removing administrative support. This
Comment finds that the issue is not the likelihood that such coercive actions would
actually occur; rather, it is the lack of institutional safeguards to prevent these acts.
352. See supra notes 146-50 and accompanying text.
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2. The Current Proposal Would Unbalance the Powers
The separation of the Law Lords and the creation of the Supreme
Court would answer the concerns of apparent judicial independence
raised by the HRA. However, the government must also take steps to
ensure the continued relevance of the judiciary and its high court.
This Comment argues that a more formal separation of powers with
no judicial functions in the House of Lords and a Supreme Court with
the power to review and annul legislation are the proper heirs of the
previous regime centered on a unitary Parliament and a balance of
powers.
The primacy of Parliament and the informal distribution of power
are the central elements of the balance of powers.353 To preserve the
balance of powers, the emergence of a strong executive position in the
Prime Minister must be balanced by the judiciary as well as the
legislature.354 However, if the executive and the legislature are not
formally separated, and the executive is functionally separate, then
"the Executive will have carte blanche power to act as it so desires."
355
And separating the judiciary from the executive in Parliament would
only lessen the informal interaction among the branches, which
frustrates the proper balance of powers.
The proposed Supreme Court provides an example of this
unbalanced executive power. The Prime Minister and his inner circle
of advisors acted unilaterally with little input from outside advisors in
proposing the Supreme Court. 356  The immediate reaction to the
proposed reforms was generally one of confusion.357 Although the
proposal for the new Supreme Court was published on June 14, 2003,
the public still remains unsure of the status of Blair's constitutional
reforms in general and the promised Supreme Court in particular.
358
The surprise of the sweeping reform announcements was not limited
to the public-members of the Cabinet were not previously told of the
sweeping changes.3 59 In current practice, the executive may set the
agenda for reform checked only by the imprecise political process of
Parliament and periodic elections.
Indeed, commentators argue that Blair's constitutional reform
platform suffered from the autocratic power of an unchecked
353. See supra Part I.B.2.
354. See Barendt, supra note 86, at 614-15.
355. Id. at 615.
356. In fact, the announcement took many members of Blair's cabinet by surprise.
See Andrew Le Sueur, New Labour's Next (Surprisingly Quick) Steps in
Constitutional Reform, Comment, 2003 Pub. L. 368 (citing Kamal Ahmed, Cabinet
Ignored Over Historical Legal Reforms, Observer (London), June 15, 2003.)
357. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
358. See, e.g., Lost Opportunity, supra note 242, at 20.
359. See Le Sueur, supra note 356, at 368.
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executive."6 The Supreme Court proposal, for instance, appears to
directly contradict recent statements of longstanding governing
principles.36" ' If the government is able to abolish the Lord Chancellor
and create a new Supreme Court, then major constitutional reforms
are left to the whim of the political majority.36 Particularly troubling
is the inconsistency in the government's position. For example, in the
November 2001 White Paper that proposed reforming the House of
Lords into a more functional second chamber, the government stated
that it is "committed to maintaining judicial membership within the
House of Lords." '363 Now, without a change in party control, the
government has reversed its position and aims to remove the Law
Lords from the upper chamber of Parliament.3" Such dramatic shifts
in government policy emphasize this Comment's concern that the
executive power would only be heightened by removing the Law
Lords without increasing their powers to interact with the other
governing powers.
It should be emphasized that the proposed reforms remain in an
uncertain status.365 Since the Prime Minister acted unilaterally to
create a cabinet position with the authority to establish a Supreme
Court, the future of the new court remains largely at the discretion of
the executive.366 After no government action on the issue for six
months, the head of the Department of Constitutional Affairs, Lord
Falconer, recently reaffirmed the government's interest in judicial
360. See Two Cheers for Modernising Government, But Presidential and Crony
Politics is Bad News, The Sunday Herald (Glasgow), June 15, 2003, at 8 [hereinafter
Two Cheers for Modernising Government] ("[W]ith General Blair in charge...
Itihere is no consultation. Instead we have diktats and orders that must be obeyed.").
361. See Le Sueur, supra note 356, at 370.
As recently as April 2003, the Lord Chancellor told MPs that: 'It is a central
organising principle of our existing system of justice that the Lord
Chancellor is head of the judiciary and it works in a whole range of examples
quite beyond that of the traditional function of upholding the independence
of the judiciary.' It is not clear how or why the Government's 'strong belief'
in a 'central organising principle' came to be replaced with a commitment to
abolish the office of Lord Chancellor and establish a new Supreme Court.
Id.
362. See Russell, supra note 43, at 339-41 (observing the political and fragile nature
of constitutional reform); Vick, supra note 60, at 330-31 (noting that HRA could be
removed by Parliament).
363. Le Sucur, supra note 356, at 370-71. There has been a dramatic change in the
government's reasoning. Compare id. ("The Government agrees with the Royal
Commission that there is no need arising from the present reform for the judicial
functions of the House of Lords to be removed."), with Supreme Court, supra note 4,
18 ("The Government will legislate to abolish the jurisdiciton of the House of Lords
within the UK's judicial system.").
364. Supreme Court, supra note 4, 7.
365. See Russell, supra note 43, at 339-41; Lost Opportunity, supra note 242, at 20;
supra notes 242-43 and accompanying text.
366. For example, while the proposal was issued in June 2003, commentators
worried that the government would not follow through with the reforms when its
silence stretched into November. Lost Opportunity, supra note 242, at 20.
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reform.367 Without a formal system for sharing powers, the UK
Government remains prone to political pressure.368
Moreover, without a formal check on executive power, the
government may institute reforms subject only to the withering, but
imprecise, process of parliamentary debate and political pressures. 36
9
The reaction of the press to the proposed reforms demonstrated the
uncertain nature of the political will to reform. For example, a
Sunday Herald editorial charged that "Blair is now overly concerned
with his legacy and therefore willing to play dictator to get where he
thinks he should be."37  The Independent criticized the poor
implementation of the reform of the House of Lords, which left "the
UK with the only legislature boasting a wholly-appointed chamber in
the world." '371 The government has abolished hereditary peers, but
replaced them with appointed, not elected, members.37  The
Independent worried that similar political machinations would lead to
the downfall of the proposed Supreme Court.3 3 Under such a regime,
the UK is left with a political process that operates without
transparency and without the bright-line rules of a system with a more
formal separation of powers.374 Formalizing the separation of powers
and meaningfully implementing it would remedy this structural
weakness.
Because of the structural weaknesses of a unitary Parliament, the
cosmetic changes offered in the Supreme Court proposal-i.e.,
removing the judicial functions of Parliament without augmenting the
powers of the new court-would fail to strengthen the judiciary and
could result in an unbalanced government dominated by the Prime
Minister.375 Such a result contradicts the spirit of the proposed
reforms, which aim to create an effective, bicameral legislature and an
367. Compare id. (observing the government's silence and speculating on its
political fate), with Falconer, supra note 6.
368. See generally Russell, supra note 43, at 339-41 (observing the precarious
nature of constitutional reform).
369. See Lost Opportunity, supra note 242, at 20 (describing Blair's pattern as
"[h]igh, ambitious, rhetoric about change [that] will be followed by a much more
cautious approach in legislation which in turn will be further watered down through a
process of parliamentary attrition").
370. See Two Cheers for Modernising Government, supra note 360, at 8.
371. See Lost Opportunity, supra note 242, at 20.
372. See Russell, supra note 43, at 260-94 (discussing the transformation of the
House of Lords); supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text (discussing same). See
generally HOL's Next Step, supra note 17 (discussing government's proposal for
further reforms).
373. See Lost Opportunity, supra note 242, at 20 ("We must hope that the new
Supreme Court is not as botched as some of the Government's constitutional
tinkerings.").
374. See supra Part I.B.3.
375. Indeed, the continued relevance of the high court in protecting individual
rights would be tenuous as the legislation that recognizes individual rights would exist
and be enforced only at the leisure of Parliament.
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independent Supreme Court. The judiciary should have a greater role
in shaping the reforms of the governmental structure.376 This
enhanced role requires greater power for the judiciary-powers not
currently given to the proposed Supreme Court.3 77 This emphasis on
structural checks on governmental powers is in keeping with the
"modern footing" of separation of powers.
B. Recognizing the Separation of Powers
The proposed Supreme Court reflects a step towards the separation
of powers but currently relies too much on the balance of powers to
protect individual rights. A mixture of the two concepts of
distributing power can result in unbalanced power.378 If formally
separated, as in the United States, the governing powers can be
checked within the system.3 79 Similarly, under a balance of powers
regime, the powers can in practice be shared evenly.38
By adopting separation of powers, the Labour government has
begun a paradigm shift away from the balance of powers doctrine and
parliamentary sovereignty. By passing the HRA to recognize
individual rights, by reforming Parliament into a functional bicameral
legislature, and by creating a Supreme Court independent from both
legislative and executive powers, the government has laid the
framework for a proper enforcement of individual rights and a
modern relationship between the governing powers.381 The Supreme
Court proposal represents a move towards separation of powers in
practice if not in theory.382 This Comment suggests that to effectively
protect individual rights the government should embrace the doctrinal
shift and then ensure the relevance of the new Supreme Court by
granting the power to overturn legislation incompatible with the
HRA.383
376. See Stevens, supra note 6, at 148 ("With so much constitutional change and so
little sense of what New Labour's goals for the Constitution are, with the power of the
House of Commons in decline,... some greater role for the judiciary is probably
inevitable.").
377. Supreme Court, supra note 4, Executive Summary ("There is no proposal to
create a Supreme Court on the US model with the power to overturn legislation.").
But see infra Part III.C for a discussion of why the explicit separation of powers needs
a Supreme Court with judicial review.
378. Cf Stevens, supra note 6, at 86 ("In a system of responsible government, the
different branches of Governmen[t] interact constantly."). It logically follows that if
they fail to interact, then one branch could abuse its powers.
379. See Picker, supra note 22, at 20.
380. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
381. See A New Way of Appointing Judges, supra note 17; HOL's Next Step, supra
note 17; Reforming the Office of the Lord Chancellor, supra note 17; Supreme Court,
supra note 4; see also supra note 17 and accompanying text.
382. Supreme Court, supra note 4, $1 1, 7.
383. See infra Part III.C.
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Despite contrary statements reaffirming the balance of powers and
parliamentary sovereignty, government action suggests that they are
adopting a more rigorous separation of powers.3 4 As part of the
recent moves to reform the House of Lords and create a legislature
based on proportional representation, the Supreme Court represents
an explicit step towards separation of powers."' The government
reforms envision a functional, bicameral Parliament with no judicial
responsibilities and a powerful executive in the office of the Prime
Minister.386  Formally recognizing the separation of powers would
ensure the relevance of the Supreme Court because the Court could
check the actions of Parliament and the Prime Minister.
Thus, the UK should adopt an explicit separation of powers
doctrine. The Supreme Court proposal recognizes the benefits of a
judiciary structurally separate from the legislature.387 Moreover, the
language of the proposal indicates a desire to move away from the
balance of powers.3 8 The government should formally recognize the
separation of powers to secure the recent recognition of positive
individual rights and to check the growth of Prime Ministerial
power.389
Although the balance of powers may work in practice, the renewed
emphasis on recognizing individual rights calls for securing those
individual protections.39 The HRA marked a turning point in British
domestic law as it officially recognized positive individual rights.39'
And by preserving the balance of powers and parliamentary
legislative supremacy, the Supreme Court proposal fails to explicitly
satisfy the requirements of the HRA and undermines the Act's
influence.3" The continued existence of the HRA and the positive
individual rights that it protects now resides solely in the hands of
Parliament.393 The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, by severely
limiting the judicial review of legislation, prevents the effective
separation of powers.394 The recognition and protection of individual
384. See Supreme Court, supra note 4, 7; Falconer, supra note 6 ("I believe that
judicial independence is so important, so vital to this country, that it now needs to be
enshrined in law. That is what I announced last week [in the Queen's Speech]. That
is what will be in the legislation which we will bring forward.").
385. See Picker, supra note 22, at 9-12 (describing the "[tlransformation of the
House of Lords").
386. See id. at 12 & nn.40-41.
387. See supra Part II.C.1.
388. See Supreme Court, supra note 4, 1; Falconer, supra note 6; see also supra
note 6 and accompanying text.
389. See supra Part I.C.
390. See Vick, supra note 60, at 372.
391. See id. at 351.
392. See Supreme Court, supra note 4, at Executive Summary, $ 23; see also supra
Parts I.B.1-2 (noting the relationship between parliamentary sovereignty and the
balance of powers).
393. Vick, supra note 60, at 330-31.
394. See Stevens, supra note 6, at 79 (finding that parliamentary sovereignty
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rights should not be left to the slim (and judicially unenforceable)
guarantee of action provided by parliamentary enforcement of HRA
declarations of incompatibility; these rights also exist for individuals in
the political minority who might not receive effective support in
Parliament. By replacing a balance of powers with a more rigorous
separation of powers, the government could secure the future of
individual rights through the judicial opposition to majority
pressure.395
The government seeks to distinguish the Supreme Court proposal
from the American model.396 But the growth of the Prime Minister's
power during the last thirty years and the proposed functional bi-
cameral legislature indicate that the British Government is already
adopting a similar structure save for the expansive power of the
judiciary.397 The system of checks and balances crafted by the U.S.
Constitution did not prevent the mixing of governmental powers.398
Instead, the American separation of powers calls for the structural
isolation of these powers into branches with a practical mixture of
responsibilities to check the other branches including the ability to
overturn legislation.399 Regarding the Supreme Court proposal, the
mixing of governmental power is not in question; rather, the danger
here is the isolation of the Supreme Court without an effective check
on the actions of Parliament and the executive. The government
should adopt a more formal separation of powers to secure judicial
independence .400
To properly put the governing powers "on a modern footing, 401
Part III.C argues that the Supreme Court needs the power to overturn
legislation to provide a proper check on legislative and executive
actions.
C. An Independent Supreme Court Needs the Power of Judicial Review
The separation of Parliament from its judicial role is needed, but
without augmenting the review powers of the new court, the court
would effectively be isolated and would not have the constant
effectively minimizes the role of the judiciary in governing).
395. Barendt, supra note 86, at 599 (arguing that the effective separation of powers
preserves individual liberty).
396. Supreme Court, supra note 4, 23. Paragraph twenty-three distinguishes the
English proposal from the American Supreme Court by stating that the English Court
would not have the "power to strike down and annul congressional legislation." Id.
"In our democracy, Parliament is supreme." Id.
397. See Russell, supra note 43, at 260-94; supra notes 44-54 and accompanying
text.
398. See Chongwe, Judicial Review of Executive Action, supra note 82, at 105.
399. Vick, supra note 60, at 351-52.
400. See, e.g., Stevens, supra note 6, at 141 (describing the potential
"Americanisation of the separation of powers").
401. Supreme Court, supra note 4, 1.
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interaction required under the doctrine of balance of powers. 2 This
section argues that the Supreme Court proposal requires a clear
statement of the power of judicial review. If the British courts already
have the power to review legislation and compel compliance,4 3 then
including the concept of judicial review is a simple, yet important,
formality. To create an effective high court, the UK must expand the
review powers of the Supreme Court. While the language of the
current proposal does not expand judicial powers,4 " the power to
review and overturn legislation incompatible with the HRA is
necessary to maintain a proper judicial role for a Supreme Court
separate from Parliament and charged with protecting individual
rights.
1. Judicial Review of Legislation
For the new reforms to have proper effect, the UK Supreme Court
should have a meaningful power of judicial review.4 5 The ability to
strike down unconstitutional legislation would vest the judiciary with
sufficient power to balance the Prime Minister and Parliament. As
illustrated in Part III.A, in a system lacking formal powers to review
legislation, the Supreme Court would have no power to compel
parliamentary or executive action. If the majority of the people and,
through popular election, Parliament, agree with the Prime Minister,
then there is no check on executive actions.40 6 A Supreme Court, with
judicial review, offers a strong mechanism to counter swings of the
political majority and reinforce the rule of law.
Vesting the Supreme Court with the power of judicial review would
protect individual rights as recognized by the HRA.4 °7 For example, if
an Act of Parliament violates the HRA, the judiciary can only issue an
advisory opinion and leaves the responsibility for overturning the
offending legislation with Parliament.4 °" If Parliament disagrees with
the judicial ruling, it may ignore the holding.40 9 The HRA would then
402. Stevens, supra note 6, at 86; see infra Part 1II.C.1.
403. See infra note 428 and accompanying text. This modified form of judicial
review stems from the European courts' recognition of human rights claims. This
doctrine of judicial review grew substantially following the passage of the HRA
because UK courts were allowed to issue declarations of incompatibility. Vick, supra
note 60, at 330-31.
404. Supreme Court, supra note 4, at Executive Summary, 23.
405. See infra Part III.C.2. The power to review and strike down legislation would
give the courts power inconsistent with the fundamental basis of the British
constitutional system, parliamentary sovereignty.
406. See supra Part III.A.2.
407. See supra Part I.C.
408. Vick, supra note 60, at 330-31; see Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 4 (Eng.)
(allowing courts to "make a declaration of incompatibility"), available at
http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/actsl998/80042-d.htm; see also supra notes
112-14 and accompanying text.
409. See Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 3 (Eng.) (stating that incompatible acts
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only protect individual rights when it is convenient for Parliament to
enforce them.410 Parliament, in practice, may rigorously enforce the
judicial decrees as when the balance of powers functions properly;
however, Parliament is not compelled to do so.4" By giving the
Supreme Court the power to overturn legislation that violates the
individual rights protected in the HRA, the government would
provide a more efficient check on Parliament's powers.412
Without recognizing the power of judicial review, the government
could push the judiciary and the Supreme Court into even greater
irrelevance. 3 The balance of powers works only if the judicial,
legislative, and executive powers of government share power and
interact informally throughout Parliament.4 4 If the government
removes the judicial functions of the House of Lords without
increasing the powers of the Supreme Court, then the judiciary cannot
effectively balance the other two powers.41 Such a Supreme Court
would appear structurally independent of the House of Lords, and
thus satisfy the appearance requirements of the HRA.416 But a
cosmetically independent Supreme Court operating without judicial
review would not "put the relationship between the executive, the
legislature and the judiciary on a modern footing";417 instead, it would
simply remove the judiciary from any meaningful power in
418governing.
The American Supreme Court provides an example of the power of
judicial review to protect individual rights of the political minority.
The Court was founded on the principles of separation of powers.419
are still valid until Parliament acts to remove them), available at
http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/80042- d.htm.
410. Cf Vick, supra note 60, at 330-31.
411. See supra Part I.B.2. Consider the analogous situation of the Law Lords'
ability to speak in the House of Lords. The very reason the government has proposed
the Supreme Court is to formally end the Law Lords' potential conflict of interest.
Similarly, by granting judicial review, the government could formally ensure the rights
of the minority and end the potential abuse of majority political will.
412. See Barber, supra note 86, at 59 (arguing that the separation of powers
improves governmental efficiency).
413. In the UK, Parliament is supreme. Supreme Court, supra note 4, 23. And
since the proposal aims to maintain that supremacy and remove the judiciary from
Parliament, it follows that the UK judiciary would be inferior to, and dominated by,
the desires of Parliament.
414. See supra Parts I.B.2, II.B.2.
415. As Justice Brandeis wrote in dissent, "The doctrine of the separation of
powers... [aims] not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary
power." Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). A
formal separation of powers encourages friction among governmental powers "to
save the people from autocracy." Id.
416. See supra Part II.C.1.
417. Supreme Court, supra note 4, 1.
418. Cf. supra Part I.B.2 (emphasizing the importance of interaction between the
branches of government).
419. The U.S. Constitution separates the government into three branches. Article I
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However, the initial court was not explicitly granted the power to
overturn legislation. In Marbury v. Madison,420 Justice Marshall
announced the doctrine of judicial review, which gave judges the
power to enforce fundamental rights.421 By securing the power to
review legislation, Justice Marshall greatly expanded the power of the
American Supreme Court.422 Without the fundamental power to
review and annul legislation, the American Supreme Court would lack
the force to properly check the President and Congress.
Many countries have followed the American model. In his book
examining human rights in the UK, Rabinder Singh discussed the
impact of judicial review on enforcing positive human rights. He
found that many commonwealth countries including Canada, India,
and New Zealand allow their judges to enforce positive rights.4 23 Most
of the members of the European Union have adopted a Bill of Rights
or incorporated the ECHR and the new democracies in Eastern
Europe and South Africa have followed a similar model.424 Singh
found that no country in modern times had based their Constitution
on the UK's model of an unlimited legislature.425
Despite protestations to the contrary, the UK has taken steps
toward allowing judges to review and enforce claims of individual
rights. 426 As previously discussed, the HRA incorporated the ECHR
and recognized positive human rights in British domestic law.427
British courts, including the Appellate Committee, have some power
to review legislation and claims of individual rights.4 8 Before the
vests the legislative power in Congress. U.S. Const. art. I. Article II creates the
executive. Id. at art. II. And Article III creates the Supreme Court and authorizes the
creation of other federal courts. Id. at art. III.
420. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
421. See Rabinder Singh, The Future of Human Rights in the United Kingdom:
Essays on Law and Practice 45 (1997). In discussing the impact of Marbury, this
Comment focuses on the English interpretation of the case. This represents an effort
to overcome the American-system familiarity and bias that the author undoubtedly
possesses. For a comprehensive review of the impact of Marbury on judicial review in
America, see Marbury Versus Madison: Documents and Commentary (Mark A.
Graber & Michael Perhac eds., 2002).
422. See Singh, supra note 421, at 44-45. The potential power was so great that
President Jefferson observed: "The constitution, [under a judiciary with the power to
overturn Acts of Congress], is a mere thing of wax in the hands of the judiciary, which
they may twist and shape into any form they please." Id. at 45 (citation omitted).
423. See Singh, supra note 421, at 45-46.
424. See id. at 46.
425. See id.
426. See Vick, supra note 60, at 366-67.
427. See supra Part I.F.
428. See Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 4 (Eng.) (allowing courts to "make a
declaration of incompatibility"), available at
http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/80042- d.htm; see also Vick, supra
note 60, at 331. But see Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 3 (Eng.) (stating that
incompatible acts are still valid until Parliament acts to remove them), available at
http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts998/80042- d.htm.
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HRA, the UK had accepted the right of an individual to appeal to the
European Commission on Human Rights. 29 Therefore, expanding
and formalizing judicial review on issues of individual rights arising
out of the HRA would represent an important, but not a drastic,
change.
In a determined effort to retain the supremacy of Parliament, the
proposed Supreme Court would lack the ability to overturn
unconstitutional legislation.43 ° Presumably, it would retain the power
of incompatibility declarations that the Appellate Committee
currently exercises under authorization from the HRA. But by
retaining the traditional definition of parliamentary sovereignty, the
Supreme Court would have only an advisory role that was always
subject to change by parliamentary action.43'
2. Redefining Parliamentary Sovereignty
By preserving parliamentary sovereignty, the government proposal
distorts the separation of the Law Lords from Parliament. By
retaining the concept of parliamentary sovereignty and restricting the
powers of the new court, the government would leave intact the
balance of powers.432
The traditional conception of parliamentary supremacy is no longer
consistent with the recent emphasis on recognizing individual rights
through the HRA. 433 But instead of casting aside one of the most
accepted and foundational concepts of UK constitutional theory, the
doctrinal conflict can be resolved by redefining the parliamentary
sovereignty. The HRA and the Supreme Court proposal, along with
the larger constitutional reforms, effectively redefine the concept of
parliamentary sovereignty. This redefinition allows for the judicial
enforcement of individual rights through overturning Acts of
Parliament that are incompatible with the HRA.
Historically, and as used by the government in its Supreme Court
proposal, parliamentary sovereignty means that no one but
Parliament can directly amend or overturn an Act of Parliament.434
As Robert Stevens noted, parliamentary sovereignty "meant a
diminishing-and therefore less controversial-role for the judges." '435
The new proposal aims to retain parliamentary sovereignty by
reforming only the appearance of independence.436 According to the
429. See Singh, supra note 421, at 46.
430. See Supreme Court, supra note 4, at Executive Summary, TT 20, 23; see also
supra note 428.
431. See supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
432. See Supreme Court, supra note 4, 23; supra Part I.B.2.
433. See Part I.F.
434. See supra note 65; supra notes 60-70 and accompanying text.
435. See Stevens, supra note 6, at 79.
436. See Falconer, supra note 6 (describing the reasons for proposing a new court
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proposal, the Supreme Court would not have the "power to strike
down and annul congressional legislation" to preserve parliamentary
sovereignty.437
Retaining the government's definition leaves the protection of
individual rights dependent on Parliament's willingness to comply
with judicial declarations of incompatibility.438 Vick concluded that
the positive rights recognized by the HRA represented a shift in the
government's approach to protecting rights.439 Indeed, he observed
that the HRA contemplates a judicial role far beyond the traditional
notions of parliamentary sovereignty."' The constitutional reforms
will reshape the distribution of governing power in the UK."1
Already, these changes have led to an increased role for the courts; to
return to the government's outdated conception of the parliamentary
sovereignty would cast doubt on any judicial role in protecting
individual rights.
Parliamentary sovereignty has been effectively redefined and this
new definition can coexist with the judicial ability to overturn
legislation. As Vick observed, the modernization of parliamentary
sovereignty began in earnest with the development of the European
Community.442 This redefinition retained parliamentary sovereignty
as the bedrock of the constitutional system, but Parliament no longer
retains legislative supremacy in areas preempted by EC law."3 Vick
predicted that the HRA would act to extend this devolution of
legislative supremacy.'" The logical next step is to allow the Supreme
Court to overturn legislation incompatible with rights guaranteed by
the HRA as an exception to parliamentary sovereignty.
CONCLUSION
The UK has embarked on an unusual program of reform that could
completely remake the relationship between its governing powers.
as cosmetic changes to improve the appearance of judicial independence). Lord
Falconer noted that "ri]t need not be the case that this independence has, in fact been
compromised; however, the perception of inadequate separation exists." Id. But he
limited the change to within current constitutional constructs: "The principle of
parliamentary sovereignty will remain. The Court will not be able to strike down
legislation in the manner of such courts elsewhere." Id.
437. Supreme Court, supra note 4, 23.
438. See Vick, supra note 60, at 372 & n.334.
439. See id. at 372 ("While the Act preserves the theoretical model of
parliamentary sovereignty articulated by Dicey, it clearly contemplates an expanded
judicial role in the protection of basic human rights .. .
440. See id.
441. See id. at 350 (describing the recent reforms as one of the greatest
constitutional upheavals in UK history).
442. Id. at 370.
443. See id. ("[I]t has become clear that in practice (if not in theory) Parliament no
longer enjoys legislative supremacy in areas governed by EC law.").
444. See id.
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The government continues to press the reforms and has recently
posted responses to its initial proposal. 445 However, the question of
judicial review for the new court was specifically dismissed in the
original proposal and the government did not ask for public comments
on that issue.
Through the creation of an independent Supreme Court and a
functional bicameral legislature, the government has practiced a more
formal separation of powers than is traditionally associated with a
unitary Parliament structure. If it adopts a formal separation of
powers doctrine and provides the judiciary with the ability to review
and overturn legislation, the government could secure the distribution
of power and ensure the protection of individual rights. Providing the
new Supreme Court with judicial review would ensure that the court
does not lose the power to balance the executive and Parliament.
The historical definition of parliamentary sovereignty is outdated in
a UK with a balanced Parliament, a powerful Prime Minister, and an
independent Supreme Court. The power of historical precedent
should not be overturned lightly. As Jeffrey Goldsworthy rightly
concluded: "[Jiudges cannot justify [repudiating parliamentary
sovereignty] on the ground that it would revive a venerable tradition
of English law, a golden age of constitutionalism, in which the
judiciary enforced limits to the authority of Parliament imposed by
common law or natural law. There never was such an age." 6 History
has not provided such an age, but maybe now is the time to change.
445. Department for Constitutional Affairs, Summary of Responses to the
Consultation Paper: Constitutional Reform: A Supreme Court for the United
Kingdom, at http://www.dca.gov.uk/consult/supremecourt/scresp.htm (Jan. 2004).
The government concluded the summary of responses by restating:
The Supreme Court is part of the Government's programme to modernise
the constitution and these responses have informed the development of this
important and wide ranging reform. In due course the Government will
announce its finalised proposals, and intends to introduce to Parliament a
Bill to enable the proposed changes to be made.
Id.
446. Goldsworthy, supra note 39, at 235.
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